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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is Berkeley’s doctrine of 
substance. The doctrine whieh is studied is drawn chiefly fro* 
those of his works in which it is roost clearly set forth! j|
J & i.Mimitateg. ..gIJswJte2K3a&B»> ***
Three Dialogues between Hvlas and Fhilonoua. Berkeley* s own 
statements are examined* and some attention is given to the 
sources of his thought* as they appear in the writings of Rene" 
Descartes, Hicholas Melebranche, and John Locke.
Berkeley himself is more concerned with proving that it 
is possible to know substances* than with discussing their nature) 
consequently* his arguments on this point are examined at length. 
Reality, he says* is known directly* and not "by way of anything; 
an! by reality* he means the ideas of sense whieh of themselves 
compose the whole perceivable universe* the finite soul (or self) 
and God. The ideas* we perceive; not so God and the soult of these* 
we have "notions** that is* knowledge. He know that they must 
exist and what their nature must be, even though we do not sense 
them* because the ideas* whieh we <|o sense* require a cause and 
something which perceives them. These can only be self -subslstent* 
conscious spiritual beingss the one we call God* the other the 
soul. But the spiritual mind can know only spiritual objects) 
therefore it cannot have a "notion" of anything outside it that 
is material.
iv
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TThis recognition that only the spiritual is accessible to 
spirit conditions Berkeley’s denial of matters if* as Locke would 
say* the mind knows ideas directly and not things, then it can 
never penetrate to whatever is "behind" its ideas; hence an 
extramental* material world is completely unknowable. Matter 
can beassigned no intelligible properties* for these would be 
ideal and immaterial} it oanttot "support" qualities whieh exist 
only as ideas in the mind* "Material substance" is thus a meaning- 
less phrase* and because whatever being it stands for cannot be 
conceived clearly and distinctly, it can have no place in 
philosophy. To keep matter and an extramental world of material 
substances is only to maintain —  for no reason —  that the mind 
cannot know reality*
The speculative materials from which Berkeley constructed 
his system* other thinkers fashioned; but the design of it was all 
his own. His "ideas of sense"* collections of which compose per­
ceivable things (and whose esse therefore is perclnil ooae from 
Locke; his conception of God as the source of our knowledge of 
Mature is similar to Malebranche’s vision* and his conception of spiritual 
substance, and his method of arguing from thought to extramental 
reality is Cartesian. Using the principles which these thinkers 
taught him* he seeks to determine the true nature of reality* and 
to rid philosophy of the uncriticised survivals of the older realism 
which* in the systems of his contemporaries * produced nothing bytt 
scepticism^ reuniting* at the same time* an estranged philosophy 
and common sense.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IINTRODUCTION
The history of modern philosophy Is largely a record of think* 
era who have in some way either supported or opposed the doctrines of 
Idealism; and in the development of modem Idealism, few names have 
been accounted more significant than that of Bishop Berkeley, While 
his own system as a whole has been generally either ignored or misin­
terpreted, his influence, though consequently indirect, has been 
great. No history of modern thought would be complete without taking 
account of it; for it was its founder's merit to have seen clearly 
the major Issues raised by the New Philosophy, and to have formulated 
them in such unequivocal terns that subsequent thinkers iiave had to 
consider the problems, whether or not they agree with —  or were even 
aware of —  Berkeley's position concerning them. As Charles P. Krauth 
wrotet
Berkeley's position in the history of philosophy is a commanding 
one. By direct or indirect influence, by development or opposi­
tion, he has borne part in all the speculative thinking since his 
day. The removal of Berkeley would take away an essential link 
in the chain of modern philosophy, Without Berkeley...we should 
not have had Hume, without Hume we should not have had Kant, with­
out Kant the gigantic structure of the speculation which ends in 
the school of Hegel would not have been reared, and without this 
progressive line of thinkers we should not have had the noble 
antagonism of witnesses to other forms of thought, essential to 
the highest development of intellectual man. Without Berkeley 
we should neither have had the developed philosophy of Germany, 
nor the developed "Common Sense" of Scotland.^ -
George Berkeley, A.-Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, ed. Charles P. Krauth (Philadelphia* Lipincott, 
1873). 35. •
1
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Tha estimate of Berkeley1 s importance given in these lines is
no less true now, than when it was written eighty years ago} and it
will be the object of this study to examine in detail the doctrine
from which this importance chiefly derives, his doctrine of substance,
with necessary emphasis being placed on the denial of Matter.
Our concern will be with the philosopher, therefore, and not
with the patriot, the man of letters, or the cleric —  although it
will be necessary, in judging his system, to recall the name of
another bishop who was also a philosopher. Consequently, there are
really only two events in his biography which it is pertinent to
consider, both of which, while they are connected with learning,
are certainly no more than dispositive causes with regard to his
philosophical development. These are the fact of his education at
Trinity College, Dublin, and his "American sojourn* as the result of
the so-called "Bermuda project".
In the sketch of Trinity College as it was when Berkeley
first saw it in the year 1700, which Professor Luce (who is himself
a Fellow) gives in the second chapter of his Life, it may be possible
to detect the loving hand of the "old boy" at workj in any event the
atmosphere of the place, as it is here described, would appear to be
highly congenial to such an independent and adventurous spirit as
Berkeley's, with domestic peace restored and the Government looking
with favour upon her endeavours. Trinity's second century of existence
had begun auspiciously:
Learned societies sprang up within the walls of the univer­
sity and without} scientific study was encouraged; research 
was beginning; received opinions were challenged} the awake-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3ning had cans to Dublin, the enlightenment to her college* The 
scene was set for a daring philosophy and the denial of natter.2
That membership in "learned societies" aided in his intel­
lectual growth, there is no reason to doubts but what is more impor­
tant is the character of the formal instruction he received:
The philosophy course which Berkeley read was distinctly modernist, 
as can be seen from his Commentaries and other early writings*
No doubt there were scholastic survivals..., but most of the 
authors read were contemporary or up to date.... Locke’s Essay 
was ori the course...within two years of its publication, years 
before it received general recognition in England.3
Descartes, Malebranche and Locke, with Aristotle, Epicurus 
and probably Plato, all helped to form him; and Locke and Malebranche 
brought him to the threshold of the New Principle.** To the "progres­
sive scholarship" of Dublin, therefore, Berkeley owed his formations 
and the fact deserves to be mentioned, on account especially of the 
tender age at which "ye immaterial hypothesis" must have been con­
ceived,^ even if only as briefly as had been done here.
The details of the slightly grandiose "Bermuda project" for 
"planting ARTS and LEARNING in America* (as it is described in the 
title of the ubiquitous "VERSES*), and of the "American sojourn” 
which it occasioned, are in themselves of no interest here; but the
h. A. Luce, fctff BerfrHey, JlafegB.flf 
(London: Nelson, 1949), 31-32. [Hereafter cited as Llfe.j
•^Ibld.. 39.
^Ibid* -
5
Ibid.. 37* Professor Luce indicates here that Berkeley 
was not yet twenty when he had "learned to doubt the existence of 
matter”•
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kresults which almost three years of enforced "liberty and leisure" in
6the "distant retreat" of Rhode Island produced in Berkeley's speculative 
life are of no little significance. The activity which filled Berke­
ley's life between the publication of the Dialogues between Hvlas and 
Philanous (1713) and his embarcatlon for America (1729) prevented him 
from engaging in much prolonged philosophical study; and although he 
did make "a considerable progress" in writing the promised Second Part 
of the Principles of Human Knowledge7, the wily work of any philos­
ophical importance he actually produced during this period was the 
Latin essay* De Motu (1721). The "Bermuda project" itself was the 
product of his interest in social questions; and since* 4s he early 
confided to his patron, Lord Percival, he proposed to "spend the rest
of his days* in his New World seminary, educating the sons of colonists
8and aborigines alike "in religion and useful learning", had that 
project been successful, he would probably have written little else 
to delight lovers of English prose, and perplex students of English 
philosophy. The project, however, was not successful. Berkeley 
"did* nothing in America; as Professor Luce remarks, "there was nothing 
he could do, save write"but what he wrote there was Alclphron. in 
his own lifetime the most celebrated of his works.
6££* X’ 1-
^"Letter to the Rev. Samuel Johnson”, Nov. 25, 1729, in The 
Works of George Berkeley. Bishop of Cloyne. ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. 
Jessop (Londons Nelson, 1946), II, 282.^Hereafter cited as Works.!
^tife. 97.
9Ibld.. 12 .^
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5In another respect, too, what was a frustration to philan­
thropy was a benefit to philosophy; for the time he spent in waiting 
upon the good pleasure of Sir Robert Walpole•s government enabled 
Berkeley to cultivate the friendship of the Reverend Samuel Johnson 
of Connecticut, whom Professor Luce calls "one of the pioneers and 
architects of American education",X0 and Professor Jessop, "the 
father of American philosophy"Berkeley* s influence on American 
intellectual life came through Johnson;"^ and the correspondence 
between them, begun in America, and continued until Berkeley's death, 
has left us "an important contribution to philosophy"3-^  in the form 
of two letters from Johnson which contain "the earliest known criticism 
of any length and weight of Berkeley's theory";^  and the future 
Bishop's two replies which are important both as explications of his 
doctrine and as indications of how Berkeley regarded his earliest 
speculations some twenty years after they were made public.
The "American sojourn", there fore, may be said to have 
brought Berkeley "back" to philosophy! for by the time its impetus 
was spent, the works of his "middle" period had been produced.^
But here it will be well to leave the matter. This paper does not 
purport to be a biography, but to be an exposition of a doctrine;
129 • xx § 267 e
128. 13Life. 129.
X\orks. H, 26?.
15
Besides A^ gj-phyon, there is The Theory of Vision Vlndlc- 
filsg 51733). W-yyt ( 1 7 » . the Defence of Free-Thinking In 
mitetlfl-ffy (1735). and the new editions of the Principles and the 
Dialogues (published together, 173^ ).
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6and the foregoing material has been included only because, unlike much
of the other information referring to his personal history, it seems
to bear a direct relation to his philosophical development*
It seems difficult to appreciate much of the significance of
Berkeley's system without considering the background of ideas which
influenced it. The mechanical approach to physical reality, on which
the thought alike of Descartes and Locke was based, and which received
its definitive modern formulation in the physics of Newton, was popular*
ly conceded in Berkeley's day to have found the key to the secrets of
Naturej and Sir Isaac himself had come to be looked upon almost as a
second Moses, delivering the tables of the Law to a new generation of
the Chosen.*^ This sanguine view Berkeley did not share; of what
value could any pretended "explanation" of the universe be, he asked,
if it produced nothing but scepticism and atheism? Why should it be
entertained, if not even the imagination of its partisans could be
sumaoned to witnev for it, while the common sense of the whole of
mankind gave testimony against it? He wrote in the Preface to the
Dialogues between Hylas and Fhilonoust
Upon toe common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of 
the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are 
taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls 
tinder our senses. Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is 
not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing.
Its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. 
For, though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it 
inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason 
defective. ¥e spend our lives in doubting of those things which
The quotations given in A, S. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foun- 
dations of Modern Physical Science (Revised edition. London* Routledge
3 3  legin  “T 8-19, seem to justify this state*
ment. Cf. ibid., 202-203.
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7other «en evidently know, and believing those things which they 
laugh at, and despise.17
Hence the paradox: "the illiterate bulk of mankind" enjoys "a greater 
calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowl­
edge, and [is] less disturbed with doubts and difficulties" than the 
philosophers;^® hence too the early and oft-repeated "Mem: To be eter­
nally banishing Metahisics &c & recalling Men to Common Sense".^ 
Metaphysicians had allowed their science to became corrupt by retaining 
"uncriticised survivals" from the past —  of which a glaring example 
was Matter —  by interpreting too literally an essentially symbolic 
physics, and by applying its findings to metaphysical problems.
To the reform -- certainly not in practice to the "banish-
OA
ment" —  of this "arid metaphysics of the schools" Berkeley devoted
his energies, Intermittently, for nearly fifty years: "recalling Men
21
to Common Sense", and "giving hints to thinking men", both in ex­
pounding the notions of his own system, and in reviving the "hoary 
maxims" of antiquity. The statement in which Professor Luce Char­
acterises the Philosophical Commentaries can be applied to the mature 
system which grew out of these preliminary studies: "All turns cm his
1?Vorkt. II. 167.
18Principles. "Introduction", 1.
19
r PElitegiMffill,,QjffWWfcfrttt> entry 75L. in dS£j£S» 91.
[Hereafter cited as Phil. Conan.j
20
Note to Phil. Comm.. 751. in Works. I, 135.
Letter to Johnson", ibid.. II, 281.
22
§1H £. 350.
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8▼lew that you can have a true philosophy of the world without the 
traditional Greek notion of material substance"Around this "view", 
then, all his studies in natural and speculative philosophy were or­
ganized! from the far-reaching investigations of the Phtloso -hlcal 
Commentaries. the public prelude to the immaterial!sm in the New 
theory of Vision, the full exposition of the New Principle in the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, through its popilarized restatement in 
the Dialogues between Hylas and Phllonous. and its various more-or- 
less particular applications (to physics in Ee I'otu. mathematics in 
The Analyst, apologetics in Alclphron) to the c-iris. that remarkable 
treatise on metaphysics and medicine, in which the study of Greek 
philosophy is recommended to cure scepticism, fatalism and atheism —
Oh
the intellectual maladies arising from Mechanism, against which the
virtues even of tar-water are powerless.
It wa3 to meet the challenge of a contemporary problem that
"Bishop Berkeley Destroyed the world" (as Sydney Smith of Edinburgh
25once remarked, with more wit than accuracy); but even if a world 
that has been "destroyed" is "rebuilt", what results is not the same 
world; and if Berkeley is not allowed to have answered that problem
—  which relates specifically to our knowledge of the thing-in-itself
—  for the ages, what he did say appears to hav'. brought a new
23Works. I, 5.
2**Sirts. 331.
25"Bishop Berkeley destroyed the world in one volume octavo, 
and nothing remained after his time but mind, which experienced a 
similar fate from the hand of Mr. Hume in 1737." Quoted in Berkeley, 
Principles, ed. Krauth, )j3.
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9emphasis into philoso hy, as may be seen frm the following state­
ment by Friedrich Schlegel:
The view taken of the notion of substance properly determines 
whether a system be idealistic or not, for in true idealism 
this notion is completely set aside and annihilated.2©
If '’the view taken of the notion of substance" has become 
a valid standard for judging the idealism of a system, then Berkeley, 
by his denial of material substance, can be regarded as having con­
tributed significantly towards its establishment.
Now we are concerned here with Berkeley's doctrine of 
substance, with his affirmation of spirit no less than with his 
denial of matter; and since it is on the basis of this doctrine 
that his historical importance seems chiefly founded, it is upon 
this that emphasis will be placed. Such subsidiary problems as 
whether Berkeley himself can be called an idealist; how far his 
criticism of the Newtonians parallels tne theories of such modern 
philosophers of science as Sir James Jeans; and whether or not 
Berkeley ever formally abandoned the esse is perclpi of his youth, 
while they are of historical and critical interest, and deserve to 
be considered in passing, can not be treated at length, since to 
examine any one of them adequately would extend this essay far 
beyond the limits assigned to it.
Limitations of opace also require that another question 
of great importance in any consideration of Berkeley's philosophy 
as a whole be of secondary interest here, and that is the development 
of his epistemology. This question is intimately bound up with the
26Quoted in Principles, ed. Krauth, 6?.
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last of the "problems" listed above, for when such of his modern In­
terpreters as G. Dawes Hicks and John ^ ’ild contend that Berkeley 
gave up the esse perclpl principle of his immaterlallsm, they are 
really maintaining that ease oerclpl. as it is stated in the Prin­
ciples and the Dialogues. is in some way incompatible with the some­
what Platonic account of cognition given in the Seventh Dialogue of 
Alciohron. and in the later sections of the Sirls. How a whole body 
of critical literature has grown up in the last thirty years, in 
support and condemnation of the view that Berkeley abandoned the 
doctrine which made him famous, and since both schools present their 
opinions with much interpretive skill and insight (each writer, like 
the Devil, citing "scripture" to prove his point), if any profitable 
conclusion were to be drawn, a detailed analysis of this mass of 
criticism would have to be made in the light of Berkeley's works, 
and the whole evaluated in terms of the contents of Plato's dialogues. 
All this, while admittedly of great historical and philosophical in­
terest, is not relevant to the subject of these researches: for what 
Berkeley actually wrote is our concern, and not what that writing 
can be interpreted to imply. "Tacit admissions", therefore, "signi­
ficant omissions", and "changes of emphasis" are of minor concern.
With the delimitation of our subject-matter thus accomplished, 
one fact becomes apparent: of Berkeley's works, only two contain 
sufficient pertinent material to be of direct utility to us. Conse­
quently, the present inquiry into Berkeley's doctrine of substance 
will necessarily centre around a detailed analysis of A Treatise 
concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), and Thrgfi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Dialogues between Hylas and Phllonous (1713). The first work, styled 
"Part One", is, as Professor Jessop informs us, the only completed 
portion of a projected longer study which was to treat of Metaphysics, 
Ethics, Natural Philosophy and Mathematics, as reformed and purified 
on the basis of two general principles: namely, that the perceived 
world is the real world, and is real only in so far as it is perceived 
(which implies the non-existence of material substance): and that words 
and signs of quantity do not stand for abstract general ideas, which, 
like matter, do not in fact exist.^ "Part One", to ether with the 
accompanying "Introduction" to all the projected "Parts", was designed 
to establish those principles: and since the first of them, that the 
intelligible existence of things is their real existence, signified to 
Berkeley the very converse of "the doctrine of matter or corporeal 
substance", it is not surprising to find considerable space devoted
to the destruction of this "main pillar and support" of scepticism
26and atheism. Consequently, for the subject of these researches,
the Principles, "systematic fragment" though it be (so Professor
Campbell Fraser described it2^ ), takes on the character of a source*
book of absolutely primary Importance —  an importance refelcted in
this considered judgment by Professor Luce:
Berkeley's gift to the world was, and is, the immaterialism, and 
he placed it entire in one casket, the Principles. He published 
a preparatory study and several sequels, but he published no 
substitute for the Principles.... 1 have read all Berkeley* s
other writings carefully, critically, and ad hoc: I recognize
27Works. ii, 5-6.
28£f. Principles. 92.
29The Works of George Berkeley P.P.: formerly Bishop of 
Cloyne. ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford, 1901), I, 215.
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12
their value, but 1 am convinced that they add nothing to the essen­
tial argument of the Principles. and take nothing from It. Master 
the Principles, and you have mastered Berkeley's 1 materialism.30
However, though it does not replace the Principles, the Three 
Dialogues. which Berkeley published three years afterwards, does In 
some respects supplement It. "The new work was written because the 
Principles had failed not only to win converts but even to provoke 
discussion." Berkeley therefore set out to write as it were "a semi- 
popular introduction" to his immaterial!am, which is chiefly Important 
for us, as regards "the expansion of points" which, in Its more schol­
arly predecessor, it had been possible to "take for granted"^. 
Professor Jessop classes it with the Principles, calling them "Berke­
ley's two chief philosophical works"and the prominence of their 
role In Berkeley's system will be reflected in their use in this 
study.
Obviously, the other works are not without importance; if the 
esse percipl is given its only "complete" statement in the Principles 
and Dialogues (and an examination of the works will show this to be 
the case), there are aspects of the doctrine of substance, especially 
on its spiritual side, whieh receive significant elaboration in the 
subsequent writings. This, Professor Luce would seem to acknowledge 
in a passage excised from the foregoing quotation from Berkeley's 
Immaterial!am. in which he advises "the mature student" to read the
°^Luce, Berkeley's Immaterlallsw (Londons Nelson, 19^ 5)•
v-vi.
Ibid.. v.
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other works. Because of this, then, the other works will be eon* 
suited for their clarifications) but the doctrine of substance dis­
cussed in this paper will be that which is set forth explicitly 
in the Principles and Dialogues, and not that which is said to 
lurk in the "hoary maxims" of Siris, and the condemnations of Deism 
in Alciphron.
The edition of Berkeley's Works which has been used, is that
prepared by A. A. Luce and T. S. Jessop} but as it was impossible to
consult the lately-published fifth volume of this set, the Siris, which
33it contains, has been read in the edition of A. C. Fraser (1901).
33Although the labours of Professors luce and Jessop seem
likely to supply the lack before long, there does not yet exist, St
the time of writing, a complete and definitive edition of Berkeley's 
works. Cfor Luce's criticism of Fraser, see the former's life of 
Berkeley, 16-18*3 However, a comparison of the teat of the available 
volumes of tha new edition with the corresponding portions of 
Fraser's dees not reveal any significant variations) and for this 
reason, it seems convenient to indicate citations from the works by 
title and section number only, so that either edition may be con­
sulted. It has been necessary to make two exceptions to this rulet
in the ease of the Dialogues, and of the Philosophical Commentaries. 
The first, although written in the same form as Alciphron^ is not 
divided Into numbered sections as is the latter work) and specific 
reference to volume and page, in the new edition, is thus made 
necessary. The Philosophical Commentaries is a pair of notebooks 
bound together in what has since keen discovered to be the wrong 
order, which Professor Campbell Fraser found among the Berkeley 
papers (which have since been added to the collection of the British 
Museum) and published for the first time in his 1871 edition of the 
Works, as the Commonplace Book of Occasional Metaphysical Thoughts.
As Professor Luce Has re-edited it, the Commentaries differs radl- 
cally with regard to the arrangement of its contents from tha Common­
place Book of Fraser's editions, and uses a slightly different system 
of entry-nui&ers from that employed by 0. A. Johnston in his edition 
of 1930 (which does, however, give the notebooks in their proper 
order). Reference to the Commentaries, therefore, is made by 
title and entry-number to the taxi as" given in Luce's editio dlplo- 
matlea of 19UU, and reprinted in volume one of the new edition ofthe 
iMForks.
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With theae preliminaries disposed of, the subject of this 
paper nay be stated as falling into two main divisions. The first 
and chief of these is the study of Berkeley's doctrine of substance, 
and the second, an attenpt to place that doctrine in its historical 
setting, which will involve an examination of the external influences 
which, through development or reaction, guided Berkeley in the elabor­
ation of his system*
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THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE
In the discusaLon of Berkeley’s works in the preceding chap­
ter, we haws already noted the incompleteness of his thought. "Berke­
ley lived an active, many-sided life, was much in the public eye, and 
wrote on many things besides philosophy." He simply could not, or 
would not, devote the time to philosophy required to work out a com­
plete system of metaphysicsj and for this reason, our discussicn of 
his doctrine of substance must of necessity be incomplete.
The problem of substance is properly of metaphysical concern, 
yet when Berkeley considers it, it is generally in an epistemological 
settingi this is to be expected, for our principal sources, the 
Principles and the Dialogues, deal primarily with his theory of 
knowledge. One of his chief aims in writing these works, as he makes 
clear in the "Preface" to each, was to banish "scepticism" —  by 
which term he meant "doubt or denial of the 'reality' of the Immediate 
objects of sense." The question he proposes to answer, therefore, 
is not "What is substance?", but "Are the 'immediate objects of sense' 
substances, and if they are not, what does this imply?" He wishes to 
determine, not the nature, but the "knowability", of substance*
Thus, in the Berkeleian philosophy as it has corns down to us,
1
Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, 1.
2
Professor Jessop'3 note to Works, II, 57*
15
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we can say that the problem of substance is treated as a problem of
knowledge, and "solved* on epistemological grounds* As far as ve can
be concerned, the final argument against matter, and for spirit, as
substantial entities, must be th;t the latter is knowable, while the
former is not* Thus, Berkeley writes of matter in section 20 of the
Pr ndples, that*
If there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever 
come to know itj and if there were not, we might have the very 
same reasons to think there were that we have now*
On the same basis, he refutes a form of "Hume's objection1 when, in
the third Dialogue* Ihilonous insists to Hylas that*
I know or am conscious of my own being} and that I nyself am not 
my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active principle that 
perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas.3
As might be imagined from the foregoing, Berkeley's first 
concern in his early works is to establish the exact nature of the 
objects of human knowledge} and this, in turn, may be said to dis­
cover to him the nature of substance*^ If, therefore, tha following 
account of Berkeley's doctrine of substance appears to concern itself 
rather extensively with aspects of his theory of knowledge, it is 
only because that theory bulks large in Berkeley's own treatment of 
the question* It seems necessary to take cognizance of this fact 
here, for in this study, Berkeley's own method of exposition will be 
followed* an acquaintance with his wr tings having bred the convic­
tion that his is the most logical and most coherent approach to that 
basal doctrine of his system, the doctrine of substance*
Njf. Principles, 7*
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Therefore, this present chapter will be divided into four 
sections, based on the four groups into which sections 1 to 7 of 
"Part One” of the Principles naturally separate themselves. They 
concern, in Professor Luce's terms, "the perceived object”, ”the 
perceiving subject", "the meaning of 'existence'", and the conclusion 
implicit In these, that substance is spiritual. These first seven 
sections have been allowed to exercise this organizing function, 
because they contain a full yet admirably concise statement of the 
principle on which in reality the whole of his teaching depends* 
that to be is to be perceived or to perceive* in relation to which, 
the contents of the remaining sections of the Principles —  and 
indeed, if Professor Luce's view may be recalled, of all his other 
wo rks* —  can be seen as explaining, amplifying, and applying the 
basic doctrine, but as contributing no more than probable reasonings 
to support it.
1*1 th these preliminary conclusions stated, it will be possible 
to discuss the first of the sections mentioned above.
1. The Perceived Object
In the whole corpus of Berkeley's writings, there is prob­
ably no single passage more important in the development of his 
doctrine of substance, than the first section of The Principles of 
Human Knowledge. It conveys notions about the nature and objects 
of the knowing process which occupy just as central a position in 
the system of immaterialism, as does the validity of the experimental
$Vide supra, 12.
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method of the physical aicenees as the single possible means of 
attaining truth, in the critical philosophy of Lnaanuel Kant.^
For the %ge of Koenigsberg, that truth in any form should be 
unattainable —  that knowledge in so basic a question as the exis­
tence of the external world should be impossible —  was "a scandal 
to philosophy and to human reason in general". For the Bishop of 
Cloyne, however, the possibility thst the objects of knowledge 
might not be within the mind at all, would probably sppear less as 
a "scandal" than as an opinion unworthy of serious consideration.
One has but to read his workst in none of them does he even mention 
that there might be a problem connected with what it is exactly that 
man knows, or that any competent philosopher (since the metaphysical 
Age of Innocence) had ever provided an answer to it differing from 
that of Locke and Descartes. As will appear in the course of this 
study, it was the answer which these last-namsd thinkers did provide 
(and which, in its essentials, Berkeley accepted without question®),
Cf. "Preface to the Second Edition", Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York* The Human!ties Press, 19^ 0),
20, 23n., 25, 25n., 26, etc. Cf* "Preface to the First Edition", 
ibid., . 9n. A propos of these passages, Emil Brehier remarkst "II 
ne par ait pas douteux que Kant a pris pour type de la eonnaissance 
1'aspect de la connaisance qu'avait rendu familier la physique de 
Newtoni d’une prt une serie d*experiences eparses, acquises indepen- 
damment l’une de l1 autrej d‘autre part un concept ou une loi que / 
ddcouvre 1‘esprit et qui cr^e la liaison ou 1’unite' entre ces exper­
iences} d’une part done de materiaux passiveaent accuaules, d1 autre 
part une intelligence active qui lie entre elles ces experiences pour 
les penser." Histoir© de la ihilosophie (Parisi Presses Universi- 
taires de France," W J ,  --
^Op. cit., 3hn.
O
Cf. for example, his treatment of the reasons for the sup­
posed universal belief in matter, Principles, 56, 73. There seems to 
be nothing in the Slrls which indicates a modification of the view
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which makes Berkeleianism a tenable philosophical position} and since
both that answer, and Berkeley's interpretation of it, are stated
succinctly in section 1 of the Principles, it will not be out of place
to qpote that paragraph in full*
It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of 
human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted 
on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the 
passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by 
the help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, 
or barely representing those originally perceived in the afore- 
said ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with 
their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for 
example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and 
of all these more or less either as to quantity or degree. Smell­
ing furnishes me with odours) the palate with tastes, and hearing 
conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and comp­
osition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each 
other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed 
as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, 
figure and coasldtence having been observed to go together, are 
accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other 
collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a bo ole, and the 
like sensible things} which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, 
excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.9
Setting aside any consideration of its obviously Lockean over­
tones, it will be a sufficient commentary on this passage, for the 
purpose of this study, to determine what Berkeley means by "idea") 
since this would appear to be a key to his theory of knowledge, and 
thus of great significance in his doctrine of substance. It will be 
helpful, therefore, in a negative way, in discovering the exact sig­
nificance he attaches to this word, to contrast it with "idea" in 
the Platonic tradition of innatism, with the "concept” in the Aris­
totelian tradition of realism, and with the term as it is used in
given here, on the locus of the objects of intellectual knowledge, 
which are discussed there at length.
^Principles, 1.
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the epistemology of Lockean empiricism*
For the matter under discussion, a comparison of Berkeley's 
use of the term "idea", and the value given to it in his theory of 
knowledge, with the usages and "evaluations" of Plato and the Aris­
totelians will prove especially significant* First of all, to com­
pare aspects of Berkeley's theory of knowledge (as it is found in the 
Principles and the Dialogues) with Plato's, will throw considerable 
light on the relation of Berkeley's early thought to that of his 
mature, "Platonic" period, in which the Siris was written} and will 
serve, in part at least, to indicate whether the Platonism of the 
Siris logically requires the abandonment of the Immaterial!sra of the 
Principles* Secondly, Aristotle was the classical defender of 
Realism, who elaborated a philosophy which offers a coherent explan­
ation of the world of common sense} and in so doing established a 
tradition which gave metaphysical currency to such notions as Sub­
stance and Accident, Matter and Form, and the Abstractionist Theory 
of knowledge, all of which Berkeley, as himself a defender of common 
sense and realism, felt obliged to prove in some way misleading* The 
reason for this, as the content and character of Berkeley's criticisms 
would indicate, will not be found in the philosophy of Aristotle him­
self, nor in the system his Scholastic interpreters built upon it, 
but rather In the interpretation put upon this Aristotelian Scholas- 
tisism by modem philosophers —  Descartes and Locke, in particular —  
who had allowed fragments of it to survive into their systems* In 
this second comparison, therefore, the traditional Aristotelian doc­
trines will be sketched briefly, in order primarily to clarify the
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positions which exercised a direct influence upon Berkeley.
With so much said, it is possible to turn now to the compar­
isons themselves.
Plato held that nan’s senses infora him of a fleeting shadow 
world, in tiiich he recognises what "a real and prolonged effort of 
steady thinking"3-0 reveals to be imperfect copies of the several 
constituents of the world of essences (or Forms, or Ideas) which 
the soul contemplated before it was for sin imprisoned in a body.3-3- 
*he Ideas, among which are included the archetypal esences of 
homogeneous things, are in some way innate, and the reception of
data from the senses is the occasion of awakening the mind to knowl-
12edge by way of reminiscence* A thing is named according as it 
imitates, or participates in —  to give both of the metaphors Plato 
employs3^  —  the Idea in the world of essences.3^
^A. 1, Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Woric (5th ed., Londont 
Methuen & Co., 19U8), 13d. "r 11"" Tr“" 1' "rr''... r~"‘
^Meno, 8l-86| Phaedo, 73-81tj Ihaedrus, 218-2501 in The Dia­
logues of Plato, trans* B. Jowett (New' foric* ftandom House, 193^),f» 
252-25U. That the mythical presentation of the 
early dialogues in general symbolises doctrines which Plato approached 
in other ways in the later works seems to be the opinion of Sir David 
loss (Plato’s Theory of Ideas), who comments in particular* "We come 
to the conclusion,' men,1' that there is no real evidence that there was 
a later theory of Ideas in which Plato denied the existence of Ideas 
which he had earlier recognized. It may be added that...the fullest 
list of types of Idea to be found anywhere in Plato is in one of his 
latest writings, the Seventh Letter.” (175) Of. ibid., 139-lUl.'
■^ That the discussion of knowledge in the Theaetetus need not 
be Interpreted to mean that Plato ever abandoned his theory of Anam­
nesis, or that to know is to remember (which necessarily implies that 
the objects of knowledge —  the Forms, or Ideas —  are innate) is the 
opinion of Francis Comford, in his Plato’s theory of Knowledge, 2r 
$ t 28, 129. Cf. Sir D. Ross, oy» ciTT^  , 3£, lo3, and J, A. Stewart, 
Plato’s gytxffne of Ideas, 68, 192-197.
' C^f. Roas, op. cit., 231.
lUcratylus, 389, U22-U23; in Dialogues, II, 179, 211-213.
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An examination of the Berkeleian "idea" against this Platonic 
background reveals, first of all, that the illustrations given in the 
quoted section of the Principles involving the senses, and the further 
observation that, when several "ideas” accompany each other regularly, 
they are "marked by one name, and so...reputed as one thing", suggest 
a psychological, and nominalistic use of the word which attributes to 
it a "value* not, in any traditional sense, an "intellectual" or cog­
nitive one* As Berkeley tells us in the Philosophical Commentaries. 
whose pithy statements seem to reflect his mature thought in this 
particular, "By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing",^ and 
further, "All ideas come from without, they are all particular". 
Consequently, on this point, the Berkeleian "idea” can be seen to 
differ, not only from the Platonic Idea, or Sorm, or Essence, but 
from the Aristotelian concept as wells for it is sensual and partic­
ular, not intellectual and universal, and is strictly speaking not 
concerned with "homogeneous tilings", but with the senslbilla of tfiieh 
"things" are composed.^
In two other —  and equally important —  respects, however, 
Berkeley seems at first sight to be antagonistic, specifically to
lgPhil. Comm.. 77$.
^Ibid.. 318.
17If intelligible universals —  Form, and essences rendered 
present to the understanding in concepts —  could be "placed" at all 
in Berkeley’s analysis of "the perceptual situation* (in Professor 
Luce’s phrase), they would necessarily be connected with "notions" —  
as Berkeley came to denominate the objects "perceived by attending 
to the passions and operations of the mind", which will be studied 
in the next section —  and with the "names" which are applied to 
ensembles of perceptions.
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the Platonic spirit i first, he says that "All ideas come from without*1 
—  that is, they can in no sense be regarded as innate —  and, second, 
"with the Mob", he places "certainty in the senses".Bat in the 
first, the antagonism is only apparent! here, Berkeley means by "idea" 
what in Plato is signified ty "impression", "phenomenon", or "appear­
ance"^ (the last term replaces "idea" in the Siris), and since Plato 
newer held these to be innate,the two philosophers are seen to be 
in agreement cm this aspect, at least, of their "externality". In 
the ease of tile second, Berkeley’s early view of where "certainty" 
was to be found did not persist into his mature thought (as is evi­
dent from Alciphron, and to a far greater degree, from the Siris).
l8Phll. Coma., 7h0.
^This Meant to be self-evident. In his enumeration of the 
objects of knowledge, Berkeley speaks of the first among these as 
"ideas actually imprinted on the senses" (Principles, 1)j as we shall 
presently discover, he identifies collections of these "ideas" —  
that is, of the data provided by the senses —  with "real things* 
(ibid., 33), or the several constituents of the physical cosmos.
That Plato acknowledged the reality of this cosmos, there can be no 
doubt. Simple perception of it may not constitute knowledge (cf. 
Theaetotus, I8i»-l86)j the Forms may be more truly real ihan the 
phenomena of which it is composed (cf • Republic, V, ii?6-h78)j but the 
very fact that he chose to devote a*Targe pari of at least one dia­
logue —  the "first part* of the Parmenides —  to a discussion of the 
relation between the Forms and the particular beings which participate 
in them, would indicate that he was not unwilling for the philosopher 
to accord some consideration to the finite and the mutable. In con­
nection with Socrates’ statement (Phaedo, 7b) that when one begins to 
understand a finite, sensible thing,' hhe first fact to be discovered 
about it is that it is an imperfect "version* of something itoich im­
plies perfection, A. E. Taylor remarks that the doctrine of Forms 
"implies a ’realistic'metaphysicj from the point of view of ’nomin­
alism', *terminal!sm*, or teoneeptuallsm*, the whole doctrine is non­
sense." Op. clt», I88n.
200f. Socrates* discussion cf the senses, in Republic, VI,
$07, which centres around his comparison of the role of the form of 
the Good (as the source of being and intelligibility) in knowing, 
with that of the sun (as the source of light) in seeing. The Dia­
logues of Plato, I, 766-767* Cf. Theaetetus, 156-157.
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Hov.uver, aa this rejection of “sensism” required no change to be made
in bis doctrine of substance —  a fact which will become apparent In 
due course —  it is not necessary to consider the point further.
In section 335 of Sjris, Berkeley records this distinction 
between his own and Plato’s usagej "In Plato's style,” he comments, 
"the terra idea doth not merely signify an inert inactive object of 
the understanding, but is used as synonymous with . . .  cause and
principle." this serves to remind us that Plato's ideas are arche-
21typesj and in the Dialogues, Berkeley acknowledges "a two-fold
state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal
and eternal", adding that "the former was created in time) the latter
existed from everlasting in the mind of God.1,22 Again, in the second
of his two letters on philosophical questions to the Reverend Spaniel
Johnson, Berkeley writes that he has "no objection against calling
the ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours"j23 thus, if one
wishes to regard the Platonic forms as Divine Ideas (as Professor
2luJessop seems to suggest is possible ), one might say that the 
Berkeleian "idea” is related to the Platonic Idea or Fora, as is an 
ectype to its archetype. What the Bishop's awn opinion on this 
matter might be, however, it is impossible to say* for we have just
23Tiiaaeua, 28-29, ibid., II, 12-13.
2gWorks, II, 25U.
23Ibld., 292.
2^ Ibid.t - 268. But "if Plato's id^s were independent of 
God [as seems probable* vide Timaeus, 30-31) cf. Taylor, op. cit.,
1*1*2) Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology. . l*lj Ross, op. cit., £31-233],
Berkeley would condemn tlbiem as 'unknown'". A. A. luce, "The Unity of 
the Berkeleian Philosophy (II.)", Mind, XI,VI (1937), 187.
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quoted tine only references to "archetypes" which appear in his pub­
lished writings, and he never treats in detail of such problems as 
creation, God’s knowledge, or how much of Plato's metaphysic he is 
actually willing to accept. Nevertheless, in purely Platonic terms, 
there seems to be no reason why the Demiurge could not cause in us 
temporal, particular and transient "ideas" in imitation of eternal, 
universal and immutable Forms,
The archetypal value attached by Plato, and in a modified 
sense, by Berkeley, to the term "idea", will serve quite well to 
bring the f irst of our comparisons to a close, and to make the 
transition to the second. Although he held (albeit with reserva­
tions) for the classical signification of "archetype”, which implied 
a necessary relation to Mind, both as "thinker" to "contain" and as 
"creator" to make real, there was yet another, modem interpretation 
put upon the word, which implied no such necessary relation, and 
which Berkeley never would acc;pt —  an interpretation connected with 
the representational theory of knowledge, as taught by two of the 
foremost thinkers of his own day, Descartes and John Locke, Now, 
there is a text Iron Aristotle, cited by one of his mediaeval com­
mentators, which, in its Scholastic setting, throws a good deal of 
light on this representational theory of kno ledge, and serves to 
bring it into an historical and interpretative perspective! for which 
reason it seems appropriate to consider it here.
The text, which states the relation that obtains among 
thoughts, words, and things, is drawn from the second book of the 
Organon, Perihermanias, and is given in the following translation!
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"Voces stmt slgna intelleetuum et intellectus sunt rerum similitu- 
dines*” 3 Here, the dif ferences of relationship are stressed by the 
use of a distinct term to signify each, slgna and almllitudlncs.
The w>rd or name is an arbitrary and conventional sign, a truth to which 
the diversity of languages bears witness. The concept or "thought" or 
"idea", on the contrary, is a likeness, an intellectual representation, 
expressing the very nature or essence of that of which it is the like- 
ness. Its whole function being to express, it can never be known
directly, but only ref lexi vsly, and by the formation of another con*
27
cept. It is, in other words, always cmrely a means, and never
(directly) an object, of knowledge. Between things and thoughts, 
there intervenes the celebrated process of abstraction, in which the
Cf. S* Thomas Aquinas, Suraraa Theologies, I, $.13, a.i. The 
text appeajrs to join two phrases separated in ike original, which the 
translation in the Oxford edition of Aristotle's Works renders thust 
"Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience' and written words 
are IT» symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same 
writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental 
experiences, which these directly symbolise, are the same for all, 
as also are those things of which our experiences are the images...“. 
"De Interpretationew, I. l6a3-B, in The Basic Tories 6T Arisiotle, ed. 
Hie hard McKeon (%w Yorks Random House, 19lii), ItO. » ........
26On the functions here assigned to the concept, see J. Mari- 
taln, Lea Degree du devoir (5* edition* Parist Deselee de itrouwer, 
19U6), ""Annexe I, HA "propos du concept”, especially pp. 779-791. Aris­
totle's doctrine is stated by him in broad outline only; the precise 
details of what the concept must be, and what knowing implies, have 
been elaborated by other thinkers, notably S. Thomas Aquinas, and his 
seventeenth century followed, John of S. Thomas. Nevertheless, it can 
be pointed out that the knower and the known are said to be identical 
In the act of cognition, the mind becoming the thing known (De Anima, 
n , !>, U30al0-20j It, U29b30-31) while yet remaining itself (ibid., 
ii29al5-l8)j and that the mind knows itself and its thinking processes 
only concomitantly (Metaphysics, XII, 107Ub35>-37). The objects of 
knowledge, however, are the same "universal natures" which make things 
to be what they are (ibid., Vtl, 6, 1031b6, 1032a5 ).'
27Ibld., XII, 9, 107hb35-37.
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intellect reads in, or draws out of, the phantasm, composed of sense 
data, the intelligibility, or fora, of the thing.2®
It has already been noted that the Berkeleian "idea" possesses 
non-'ntellectual (that is to say, sensual and particular) qualities 
which serve to set it off from universale in both the Platonic and 
Aristotelian sense; but the most obvious way in which the Berkeleian 
"idea" differs from the Aristotelian concept is, that it is an object, 
and not a means of knowledgea2? This fact is stated many times, and 
often emphatically, in Berkeley’s writings, but nowhere more expli­
citly than in a passage in the Dialogues, in which the Lover of Mind 
replies affirmatively to ffplas* question, "Is it not your opinion 
that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our own 
minds?"-*0 Si maintaining this view, however, Berkeley was only 
assenting to a common philosophical opinion of his day. Descartes, 
for example, taught that "thought" was the equivalent of "conscious-
28"To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents 
of perceptions". De ftnima, in , 7# b31aliu "The faculty of thinking 
then thinks the forms in the images". Ibid., U31b2. Cf. "When the 
mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along 
with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that 
they contain no matter*" Ibid., l*32a?«9. Basic Works of Aristotle,
59U and 595. Cf. I*29b21, where it is said thai intelligibility is 
proportioned to'-Lraraateriality, a fact which implies abstraction*
2?It is, as we shall see, a means of knowledge in so far as 
through its agency the mind is able to fora "notions" of (or more 
simply, is able to know) non-aensible realityt i.e., spirits and 
relations. But it is not, in the sense of Descartes and Locke, an 
image of a thing existing in material reality outside the mind which 
is known by means of the idea-image. Cf. Princip ea. 8. When it is 
asserted, in this paper, that the Berkeleian "idea” is not a means 
of knowledge, it is in this latter sense only that the statement 
should be interpreted.
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Hness*,-** and that the terra "idea" (which he defined as the form of a 
thought^) oould thus refer to any object of consciousness whatever.
whether a universal essence, a volition, passion, raeraory image, or
but as images of things, only those are true —  or possess objective 
reality —  which are clear and distinct*39 Among the "most constant* 
of these true ideas are those which concern figures and numbers —
ed. Char
32Ibld„ Definition 2.
ehoses, et c'est a celles-la seules qua convient propreraent le noa 
d'ldde*. Troiaieras Meditation, Oeuvres, IX, 29. Again, he speaks of 
a thing, the cause or original of several ideas, "dans lequel [I.e., 
dans 1’original, la choseJ touts la xwLite ou perfection, soit con- 
tenue forraellement et en effet, qui se rencontre seuleraent objective- 
raent ou par representation dans ces ideas.... Les idbes sont en raoi 
comae dies tableaux, ou des images...." Ibid., 33.
nses qux deuxieraes objections. Definition 3. Oeuvres, 
m ,  161. e?. Prinejp... I. IT. - - - - '  '
•^ "Noraen Ideae generaliter stud, pro orani re cogitata, quatenus 
habet tantum esse quoddam objectivura in intelleetu." Discours de la 
Methods, ed. E* Oilson (Parist J. Vrin, 19U7), IV, note, 320. .
3?Reponses aux deuxieraes objections, Definition 2.
^Trolsleae Meditation, Oeuvres. VH, 37j cf. Principes, I, 17.
^Cinquieae Meditation. VII, 65. Cf. "Je jugeai que je pou- 
vais prendre pour regie generals, que les cEoses que nous concevons 
fort claireraent et fort distincteraent, sont toutes vraies". Dlacours,
IV j ed. Gilson, 33. .
sense-datura.33 "Ideas" did have a representative function,^4 possess­
ing an objective reality in the mind, 3^ but in themselves they were 
things that were thought,3^ revealing, first and foremost, not things 
existing in re, but thought itself.^
Now all ideas, considered in themselves, are equally truej3®
>naes aux deuxieraes objections. Definition 1. in Oeuvres
Ibid., Definition 1. Cf, Principes de la Fhiloaophie, I, 9 
"Entre raes pensees quelques-unes sont corarae les images des
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arithmetic and geometry* ^0 but even the principles and demonstrations 
of mathematics may be doubted, if it is possible that an al l-powerful 
God might hare created us in such a way that ve are always deceived 
in everything.^ It is only after this possibility is discounted, 
and the existence of an absolutely perfect (and hence veracious)
God is demonstrated —  by means of the cogito, the imate idea of a 
perfect Being, and the principle of causality^ —  that the truth of 
our clear and distinct ideas is confirmed.^
Thus, In the Cartesia* system, "thou^ its" or "ideas" may be 
likenesses or "images" of t hings, but the ideas are themselves 
things, the direct and immediate objects of knowledge* Tet as ve 
have just seen, truth is made to consist in the agreement of the idea 
with its ideatum (in Spinoza*a terminology).^  At this point, an 
obvious objection —  that ve do not in fact know the ideatum at all 
—  presents Itselft Descartes, despite his invocation of the prin-
Uo
Ibid.
111Principes, I, 5.
112
Ibid., 7, 11, 13, Hi, 17, 18.
^Ibld.. 26-30.
“Th. objective being which an idea possesses may be inferior 
to the formal or eminent (or actual) being of the thing of which the 
idea is only a reflection, but i t Is real being none the less —
"tout ce qui est vrai est quelque chose** (Cinquieme Meditation* 
Oeuvres, VII, 65)j of. "La v6rite consists en l* t^re, et la faussete’ 
au noo-Stre seulemenf" ("Lettre a Clerselier", 2Tavril 161i9j ibid., 
V, 35S)« Indeed, the ifcols of Descartes' metaphysic is based on the 
doctrine that ideas, as real things, require a cause of their being 
(Rdponses aux deuxTsaea objections. Axioms m»V), a fact which maces 
it possfele to bridge thegap between the mind and exterior reality*
k^Troisieae Meditation, Oeuvres, VII, 37j of* Cinquieme 
Meditation, ibid., ^6.
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L6eiple of causality, really net It with the help of Godj but when 
John Locke expressed what was essentially the sane view in his Essay, 
as it were, he did not pray, and human strength was not sufficient to 
the task.^ ? At the beginning of his discussion "of knowledge in
^Whatever one way think of the validity of his reasoning, on 
his own terns Descartes does not argue in a circle heret for his, tKe 
evidence of the cogito is not subject to doubt (Peuxieme Meditation, 
ibid,, , 2U-25)j neither is the universal rule of evidence (trols- 
IKme Meditation, ibid,, * 32, 36), nor the principle of causality 
(which Is immediately deducible froa the fact of existence 1 of.
Reponses sax deuxlAaes objections, Axiom I), These are the elements 
of whicK' tKe proof for the existence of God is composed (e.g., in 
Principes, Z, 17*18)) and in the existence of a God Who is the cause 
of 'being, and thus of truth, Descartes finds his deliverance from 
doubt (Cinquieme Meditation, Oeuvres, VII, 70-71)* the guarantee of 
Divine fcracity is tKus required la'establish, not the initial evidence 
of first principles (which are per se nota), but rather the certitude 
of that evidence when it is rei^ afeerett (cf, Principes, I, 2). Without 
that guarantee, even the cogilo would 'become a mare prejudice, unless 
it were thought out every IIbb"it was recalled (3ur les clnquieaes 
objections, Qeuvrea, IX, 20$), Without that guarantee, certain knowl­
edge atany given moment would always be limited to whatever first 
principles (and perhaps the immediate deductions from them) could be 
known as self-evident at that moment (cf. Principes, I, 13)} and for 
this reason, the Divine Veracity is the~basis upon which not only the 
proof for the existence of the external world, but the whole Cartesian 
raetaphysic is built. Vide Professor Gilson’s "Coanentaire historique" 
in his edition of the Rscours de la Mdthode, , 360*361) of, E. 
Brehier, op. cit., II, 81-83. II la manifest, however, thaTVithout 
the certitude of the cogito, and the principle of causality, Descartes 
could not even begin idphilosophise.
h?Descartes, Locke and Berkeley all concur in making use of 
the principle of causality to explain the fact of knowledge) but 
there is in Locke’s reasoning on this point an "obvious inconsistency'’ 
upon which Berkeley does not hesitate to seise. Descartes argued 
thus 1 There is a real distinction between soul and body, and their 
principal attributes, thought and extension, are mutually exclusive 
(Principes, I, 23*2U, 60). All objects of knowledge, or ideas, are 
innate ••""not only those of universal laws and the like, but even 
those of sensations "Et, enfin, je tiens que toutes cellos [.les iddesj 
qui n’enveloppent aueune affirmation ou negation nous sont innataei 
car les organes des sens ne nous rapportent rien qui soit tel qua 
l’idee qui se reveille en nous a lour occasion, et ainsi eette idee 
a du etre en nous auparavant.” ("Lettre "k Mersenne”, 22 juillet 16U1, 
Oeuvres, III, U18* cf. Notae in programme quoddam, ibid., VIII, pt. 2, 
155=5^). In so far as God (of.
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general", Locks wrote*
Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other 
immediate object hut its own ideas, which it alone does or can 
contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant 
about them, h"
In an earlier discussion of ttour simple ideas", however, Incke had
Discours. IV, . 38). Now, arguing from the mind to exterior reality, 
metaphysically speaking, a thing is true in so far as it is (vide the 
texts cited in note Ui|) nothing canroi be the cause of something, yet 
everything that is is caused (responses aux deuxifemes objections. Axioms
I, III)j a oause'nost have1'at leasi as ouch perfection (or feeing) as 
the effect of which it is the cause (ibid., fudLom Vj cf• "Lettre au 
P. Vatier", 22 fevrier 1638, Oeuvres, f, jyoO-j&l). These principles 
could account for the presence (and for the representational value) 
of clear and distinct ideas in the mind without making it necessary 
to explain the apparently inexplicable interaction of soul and body 
(which Descartes nevertheless sought to do).
Locke denied the possibility of innate knowledge (Essay con­
cerning Hunan Understanding, Bk. I), saying that ideas can come to us 
only from sensatton or reflection (ibid., II, i, 2). Bodies produce 
sensations in the brain by the motion of insensible particles, and 
this causes In the mind the ideas of the primary and secondary quali­
ties in things (ibid., viii, 11-13)$ but how this can be, it is im­
possible to say,~*£Ksre being no conceivable oonnexion between any 
impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a colour or a smell 
which we find in our minds® (ibid., IV, iii, 28). It is possible, 
however, that since substance is in itself unknowable (ibid., I, iv, 
18), "finite spirits® or "thinking substances" may not necessarily be 
immaterial ("first Letter to the Bishop of Worcester®! quoted in Essay 
(London* Wm. Tegg ft Co., 18£3), UlU) -
This last suggestion, Berkeley could condemn on W o  counts* 
first, if the soul (or "thinking substance") is not immaterial, then 
it is not immortal (Principles of Human Knowledge, 11*1)| second, if it 
is material, than it is sensible, and the o'bjects of sensation are 
ideas* hence, it is an idea which knows ideas. This argument is 
similar to the one he brings against Locke's notion that impressions 
in the brain are the cause of ideas in the mind* if the brain is a 
sensible thing, then it is only an "idea or thing existing in the 
mind [whichj occasions all other ideas®! if it is not "that Wain 
which is perceivable by sense", but another which is imagined, that 
imagined brain is still in the mind as an idea, and the philosopher 
talks "of ideas imprinted in an idea, causing that same idea, which 
is absurd." (Second Dialogue between Bylas and Philonous, Works, II, 
209). It is ikus impossible, iSsriceley finds, to account for the 
origin of our ideas in corporeal things.
^Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, i, 1.
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already concluded that soma of these ware "resemblances" of qualities 
existing in bodies without the raind.k? Thus, although "it is evident 
that the mind knows not things immediately, but only fcy the interven­
tion of the ideas it has of them", still "our knowledge.•.is real only 
so far as there is a conformity betv en our ideas and the reality of 
t h i n g s . I n  other words, "to make our knowledge real, it Is requi­
site that the ideas answer their archetypes."^
This, then, was the modern interpretation of the tern "arche­
type" that Berkeley never would accept t that "ideas'*, considered as 
real, "objective" beings within the mind, co ld be copies of original 
archetypes, at real things, existing without the mind. On such a 
view, he held, "are we involved all in scepticism" a n d  against 
this (in his opinion) weak link in the chain of Locke's reasoning 
he directed the hammer-blows of his logic. In the Principles. 
immediately after giving the outline of his system, Berkeley raises, 
as the first possible objection to it, the question of the represen­
tational value of ideas} but his answer is unequivocal*
An Idea can be like nothing but an idea} a colour or figure can 
be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but 
ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for 
us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again,
I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of 
which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be them­
selves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and 
we have gained our point) but if you say they are not, I appeal
^Jbid., H, viii, 15.
%bid., IV, iv, 3.
**Ibld.. sect. 8.
^Principles, 87.
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to anyone whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like so ne­
ttling which is imriaiblaj hard ar soft, like soaething which is 
intangible! and so of the rest.53
Then, to make sure that he has indeed "gained his point", he proceeds 
to examine some of the primary qualities Individually: figure, motion, 
extension and number. He shows that although Locke, for example, 
speaks of these primary qualities as really existing in things them­
selves (as he does in his Essay, II, viii, 9), the result of allowing 
an idea which is itself an object of knowledge to intervene between 
the mind and exterior reality, is actually to make the primary quali­
ties as much dependent on our perception of them, and hence as sub­
jective, as are the secondary qualities with which they are insepar­
ably united* He concludes his analysis thust
In short, let anyone consider those arguments, which are thought 
manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the 
mind, and he shall find they may with equal force, be brought to 
prove the stme thing of extension, figure, end motion* though 
it must be confessed this method of arguing doth not so much 
prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, 
as that we do not know, by sense which is the true extension or 
colour of the object.-”*
The burden of proof for the Immaterialism may rest with the 
New Principle, that esse is percipi, as the last sentance of this 
section (which is omitted here) indicates! but Berkeley has stated 
what he considers to be a highly convincing argument in favour of 
his system) and it is on the basis of his own convinced opinion in 
this matter that he writes to Johnson:
E^i22i2i2£* 8‘
^Ibid.. 15*
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I have no objection against calling the ideas in the mind of Qod 
archetypes of ours. But I object against those archetypes by 
philosophers supposed to be real things, and to have an absolute 
rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any 
mind whatsoever) it being the opinion of all materialists that 
an ideal existence in the Divine Mind is one thing, and the 
real existence of material things an other. 55
Ideas clearly possess no representational value for Berkeley, 
as far as knowledge of an exterior and material world is concerned! 
but he still regards them as objects of knowledge. How this must be
interpreted, against the Cartesian background which has here been
sketched, is indicated by Frederick Woodbridge, who compares Berke­
ley’s use of •’idea” with Locked, and after noting the similarity of 
their definitions of the term,5^ remarks as follows*
Although they both speak. • .about ideas in the same way and assign 
to them the same position as the only immediate objects of the 
mind, it seems impossible to conclude that they were speaking
about the same thing. They used the same tern, but what that
term identified as the immediate object of the mind was not the 
same. With Locke the ideas are not the things th ich make up 
the system of nature) with Berkeley they are. With Locke they 
are what we have come to call subjective and psychological) with 
Berkeley they are not. With Locke they are mental counterparts 
of impressions on the brain) with Berkeley they are not. With 
Locke they are the means of knowing, representing what is known by 
the®) with Berkeley they are the materials of knowledge and in no 
sense representations of soma thing known by their means .5'
idb he uses the term ’’idea" "to express what­
ever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which 
the mind can be employed about in thinking". Bssjcr, X, 1, 8. It 
has already been observed that Berkeley wrote in his Commentaries 
that *!Jy idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing." kntry 77!>.
^Frederick J. S. Woodbridge, "Berkeley’s Realism", in Studie 
in the History of Ideas, edited by the Department of Philosophy of 
Columbia University (ttew York* Columbia Unive sity Press, 1918), I, 
209-210. Woodbridge undoubtedly does state an extreme position in 
calling the Berkeleian and lockean "ideas" different "things") but 
the place "idea" occupies in the hierarchy of being as each thinker 
conceives it, is certainly vastly different in each case. Indeed,
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has already been suggested, both in this last passage and what has 
gone before it, it will perhaps be convenient to summarize the points 
which our negative description of "ideas" has revealed, before pro* 
ceeding to a more documented consideration of what erkeley said 
"ideas" were* The following "negative characteristics" may therefore 
be lietedt
1* The Berkeleian "idea* is not "intellectual"! it is not 
universal, but sensual and particular.
2. It is not innate.
3. Berkeley restricts the use of the term "archetype" to its 
traditional signification of a creative idea in a divine mind, and 
makes no place for the Platonic Id a, regarded as a self*subsistent 
cause and principle which is external to any mind.
lu HLs ideas are not ectypes, in the sense of being copies 
of archetypes, or external, bodies, really existing without the mind. 
They may be considered, however, as ectypes of the Divine Ideas.
5. They have no "representative" function in the Cartesian
or Lockean sense of the word, since all that they may be said to
"represent" is an aspect of reality —  spiritual and non*sensible —  
totally unlike themselves, which nevertheless is known only by means 
of than.
6. It might be observed •* although the fact was not alluded
to in the ore going analysis *• that they are not the product of
that is all the present writer understood the phrase "it seems im­
possible to conclude that they were speaking about the same thing" 
to signify.
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abstraction.
Having seen what Berkeley does not mean by ’idea", In a 
rather negative definition, that positive characteristics he 
annexes to the terra may now be determined. He uses it in a modern 
framework, finding its nearest likeness in the philosophy of Locke 
Hence the modern concept of idea, as primarily the object, and only 
secondarily the means, of knowledge, must be understood to constitute
£8It was not thought necessary to deal with Aristotle's 
theoxy of abstraction, because, although Berkeley displays consider­
able familiarity with Aristotle's writings in the Siris, he nowhere 
takes any account of the letter's teaching on abstraction, and pre­
sumably saw no place for it in his epistemology. How he regarded 
the Lockean abstraction, will be discussed in its proper placej but 
it is pertinent to recall, at this point, that in Aristotelianism, 
while abstraction is an absolutely essential feature of all intel­
lectual knowledge, it is a 'pre-conscious prerequisite” of knowledge, 
which renders fully conscious awareness above the sense-level —  i.e., 
understanding —  possible, but which, as a process, is not itself 
known directly. For Locke, haw ever, whose theory is the only one 
Berkeley considers, abstraction is not a necessary condition of 
understanding, but a convenience in reasoning about what has been 
understood dL ready, with a view to extending the comprehensiveness 
of that understanding. It appears to be a matter of the conscious 
"framing” general ideas, which are intellectual "inventions and 
creatures8 (Sssay, III, iii, 11) the mind "thinks it aay have use 
of, either in contemplation or discourse” (ibid., II, xxxii, 7). 
Furthermore, while Aristotle held that in abstraction, the very 
nature or intelllgibilily of the thing —  all that for him is most 
truly substantial in it —  is known directly, through being pre­
sented to the understanding in the concept, fbr Locke, the real 
essences of things are forever hidden from us, and our knowledge 
is of nominal essences of the mind’s own framing only (ibid., Ill, 
vi, 9, 20*21.}
go
It mat be remembered that for Descartes, while an idea 
can, but need not necessarily be an image, it never consists in 
the corporeal phantasm or cerebral modification on which the image 
depends. Cf. Reponses aux deuxismes objections. Definition 2|
Oeuvres, TO-TST.-------------- -------
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the most fundamental note of the positive definition which follows.^®
For an examination of the Principles does yield what msgr be 
called a positive definition of "idea1*. It can be said, first of 
all, that Berkeley clearly distinguishes ideas of sense from those 
of imagination) but since the latter are copies or elaborations of 
the former, the immediate object of our concern is rather the ideas 
of sense* The distinction is set forth in section 33 of the Prin­
ciples, where Berkeley writes*
The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are 
called real things* and those excited in the imagination being 
less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed 
ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent*
The ideas of sense, then, are perceived passively, being
impressed upon the senses in sensation*
When in broad day-light I open ay eyes, it is not in ay power 
to choose Whether I shall see or no, or to determine what 
particular objects shall present themselves to ay view) and 
so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas 
Imprinted on the* are not creatures of ay will*°^
It seems important to observe at this point, even if only 
parenthetically, that Berkeley protects himself against the charge 
of subjectivism and relativity in knowledge by stressing the passive 
character of perception, and by drawing the conclusion, as he does 
in the section just quoted, that since I am conscious of not being
Berkeley cells attention to the faet himself, when Fhil- 
onous remarks in the Dialogues that "Ifjr reason for using it [the 
word idea l was, because a necessary relation to the mind is under* 
stood "td \» implied by that term) and it is now commonly used by 
philosophers, to denote the immediate objects of the understanding*" 
Works, II, 235-236* Cf. Principles, 39.
^Principles, 29*
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the author of iqjr own perceptions, and since it cannot he comprehended 
(even by the materialists with ntheir external bodies") "in what 
manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should 
imprint any ideafs} in the mind",^ there must therefore be "some 
other will or spirit that produces them*} which conclusion estab* 
lishes to Berkeley's satisfaction the activity of "tbs Author of 
Nature* as the only possible source of the ideas of sense*
Now the ideas of sense are characterized by stability*
The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than 
those of the imagination) they have likewise a steadiness, 
order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those 
which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a 
regular train or series*..*°’
This "regular train or series", this "admirable connexion" among 
the ideas of sense, is called the Law of Nature, of thich (as it 
were) the provisions "we learn by experience, which teaches us that 
such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in 
the ordinary course of things. It would seem that here, Berkeley 
has laid the very foundation of a realistic theory of knowledge; he 
has provided the mind with objects of cognition which have an 
absolute value independent of the finite mind, which the finite 
mind can in no way alter in the act of perception, and which would 
continue to exist as archetypes in the mind of o^d, even if there 
were no finite spirits to perceive them as ectypes. They have like­
wise objective relations; but these are to be accepted, it should 
be noted, not on account of the intrinsic and necessary constitution
^ Principles, 19. Vide supra, note U7.
^Principles, 30* ^Ibid*
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of things, or on the capacity of the mind to know being, but on the
authority of God. Thus, the mind knows*
That to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are condu­
cive, all of which we know, not by discovering any necessaiy 
connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the 
settled laws of Nature,®5 without which we should be all in 
uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to 
manage himself in the affairs of life, than an infant just born*®®
Thus, aL though he has based it on no more secure a philosoph­
ical foundation than faith in the habitual beneficent action of the 
Creator, Berkeley must at least be credited with having escaped sub­
jectivism, and with having found an objective guarantee for the 
validity of our ideas* Admittedly, he limits knowledge of sensible 
reality to the states and elements of consciousness (although he 
does not call them that)* and this is the mark of "subjective 
Idealism", according to Webster's New International Dictionary*
But he is persuaded that beyond the sensible reality of which he is 
conscious, there can exist nothing or no one save God, and the 
finite spirits He has created* For Berkeley, as we shall presently 
see, man's senses bring him into contact, not with a "universe of 
Nature" (in the common acceptation of that phrase), but with Him Who 
is, and Who is known none the leas surely for being perceived "dark* 
ly", by means of ideas of sense which are totally "unrepresentative" 
of Himself*
^That these "Battled laws of Nature" are only the rules 
according to which God, for no other reason than HLs solicitude for 
the infirmities and limitations of HLs creatures, has always chosen 
to act in the past in performing the works of Nature, but to which 
"habit" alone (if one may use the word) has bound Him, is shown in 
Principles* 32, 60*66, and especially, 10?.
66Ibid., 31.
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With tbs "externality" cf the ideas of sense established,^ 
and their stability, it is now time to state probably the most 
significant characteristic of these ideas of senses that is, their 
identification with real things —  not as means by which ve know 
real things, bat as real things themselves. It will be recalled 
that Berkeley says in section 33 of the Pri. nciplea, “the ideas 
imprinted on the senses hr the Anther of Mature are called real 
things".^® Here, reference may be made again to all that was said 
about the non-representative character of the * ideas* They are 
the very materials of knowledge, constitute the stuff of reality, 
and come to us with a constancy, vividness, and regularity which 
to the mind are totally objective, external and imposed. The 
characteristics of the ideas of sense, as Berkeley outlines them 
in this section of the Principles, are capital to the understanding 
of his system* Their importance caot be over-stressed, for what­
ever the mental activity to hieh they may be subjected, through the 
operation of imagination and reason —  phases of his doctrine which 
will be considered later —  they lie at the very heart of his theory 
of knowledge, and, as has bean sufficiently remarked, protect and
^Qn "externality*, see Ptlnelples, 90.
^®At the end of the Third Dialogue, Berkeley, speaking in 
the person of Phllonous, puts the is sue ole &rly in these terms t "My 
endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that 
truth, which was before shared between the vulgar and the philos­
ophers t the former being of opinion, that those things they immedi­
ately perceive are the real things t and the latter, that ine iiaings 
i ^ d llalely perceivedi. are ideas which exist only in the mind,
WHcHi "£vonotions puitogetiier,do in eWeel conaSkte the substance 
of what I advance*" kbrks, II, 262.
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safeguard it from the usual charges of reducing objective reality 
to a subjective unreality, with which idealism is so often reproached.
In the development of his explanation of the ideas of sense, 
Berkeley, as has been sews, frequently comperes them with ideas which 
are “formed by the help of memory and imagination, either compounding, 
dividing, or barely representing” those objects of knowledge origin­
ally perceived by sensation or reflexion.^9 while it is obvious 
that the ideas of memory and imagination can have existence only in 
the mind itself, Berkeley is careful lest the reader mistake him to 
mean that the ideas of sense have a different kind of existence 
without the mind. Thus, despite their privileged character as the 
most objective, constant and red of the ideas, he insists that 
they too can have no existence save in a mind perceiving them*
The ideas of sense are allowed to have sore reality in them, 
that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the 
creatures of the mind* but this is no argument th t they exist 
without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, 
or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are 
excited by the will of another and more powerful spiriti yet 
they are still ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or 
strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.
Still another quality of the ideas of sense of which Berke­
ley makes much, and which is of importance in the c ontemporary 
setting of his immaterialism, is their inactivity. In section 25 
of the Principles he states*
All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by 
whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly in­
active, there is nothing of power or agency Included in them.
^Principles, 1.
70Ibld.. 33*
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So that one Idea or object of thought cannot produce, or mate 
any alteration in another. Vo be satisfied of the truth of this, 
there Is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our 
ideas* For since they and every part of them exist only in the 
mind, It fol&s that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. 
But whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflex­
ion, will not perceive in them any poier or activity} there is 
therefore no such thing contained in them* A little attention 
will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies 
passive ness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible 
for an idea to do any thing, or, strictly speaking, to be the 
cause of any thingi neither c n it be the resemblance or pattern 
of any active being, as is evident from Sect* 8*
By urging the passivity of the ideas of sense, Berkeley seeks 
to demonstrate that any fruitfulness or growth in knowledge which 
results from reflexion upon them —  in the order of memory, imagin­
ation and reason —  is to be attributed not to any power inherent 
in the ideas, but to the pawer of spirit, of the mind itself* For, 
as they were produced by the Infinite Spirit, so they are perceived 
by our finite spirit, and all activity in either ease is from spirit*
It is well to remember thit for Berkeley, the only activity of which 
we can have any experience, is the power the mind has to excite ideas 
in Itself at pleasure, and that "when we talk of unthinking agents, 
or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition which doth very properly 
denominate toe mind active , we only muse ourselves with words*"^
This charge of indulging in verbal gymnastics, he levels against the 
Newtonians in particular, whose explanation of the physical universe 
in terms of matter and motion he finds not only false in itself, but 
(as has been observed) the very basis of scepticism. So, after 
having establi&ed to his own satisfaction the activity of spirit,
^Principles* 28.
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and the passivity of idea, he concludes his argument in these words*
hence it plainly follows that extension, figure and notion, 
cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that 
these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration,, 
number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.7
There is one final characteristic of the Berkslaian "idea" 
which must be raenti -ned before this section is concluded} and that 
is one which is never considered explicitly, and as such, in Berke­
ley's writings, but which was surely (beciuse of his concern with 
demonstrating the capacity of the mind to know reality) one of the 
most pr clous of its features in his judgment* namely, that the 
"ideas* and the reality they compose are totally intelligible. The 
steadiness, order, coherence, and obj ctlvity with which the "ideas" 
are presented constitute the Laws of Nature.73 The "ideal" reality 
which these laws govern exists, or is rendered present to intelligent 
creatures, for the sole purpose of being understood by them* the 
"ideas" are the very words, and the Laws of Nature thus the "grammar", 
of the Divine Language in which the Author of Nature is constantly 
speaking to man.7^  Therefore, Berkeley would seem to have a right to 
claim that hie conception of sensible or perceivable reality ascribes 
to it a degree of intelligibility greater than has ever been done in 
any other philosophy, ancient or modem. As he says in section 6 of 
the Principles*
Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a 
man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this
^Principles, 2$.
73Ibid„ 30-32, 36.
7^Ibid.t 65-66} of. sect. Ut, 108, and Siria, 251-261*.
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important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and 
furniture of the earth, in a word all those todies which compose 
the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a 
mind, that their being is to be perceived or known.*.*
What is the Rerkeleian “idea", then? A descriptive defini­
tion, comprising both negative and positive characteristics, may be 
stated thusi the Berkeleian "idea” is not "intellectual" and univer­
sal, but sensual and particular} is not innate, but comes from with­
out, The "ideas of sense" (to which the name "idea" properly belongs) 
are not copies or images of anything like themselves outside the 
mind, being objects of knowledge in an absolute sense} although they 
may be looked upon as ectypes of archetypal ideas in God's mind.
They arejaeans of knowledge only in so far as they direct the mind 
to the non-sensible reality which they imply —  spirits and relations. 
They are not the product of abstraction, since tie mind is totally 
passive in their reception, and can perform no operations about them 
save reasoning, imaging, and re merabering* However, because of this 
very pas iveness on the part of the mind, the "ideas" are shown to 
be objective and not subjective. Their objectivity is further argued 
for, when Berkeley cills God their cause and source. Their stability and 
order manifest the lam of Nature, and the truths implied in them 
gives them an absolute value. They are real things, constituting the 
very stuff of perceived reality} but despite their privileged charac­
ter, they exist only in the mind, and indeed they are most objective 
and most real because neither they, nor anything like or "represented 
by" them, can have any extra mental existence. They are passive, 
there being nothing "in" them but what is perceived to be there, and 
can thus never be conceived as sources of activity} but for that very
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reason, the universe which they compose is by n ture totally and 
absolutely intelligible.
Such, then, are the objects of knowledge. Man knows the 
real world direetlyj but it is an Ideal world, spiritual as is the 
mind to which it is rendered present in perception* Thus, although 
he starts from a position of Cartesian subjectivism, Berkeley is 
able, by his identification of "ideas" and "real things'* (admittedly 
a singular and complete inversion), to affirm a doctrine analogous 
to that of Aristotelian realism} but in so doing, he has completely 
destroyed the validity of the traditional Aristotelian view of the 
reality perceivable by the senses, as an immense collection of self- 
subsistant beings, in various ways accidentally modified in themselves, 
and related to one another.
Not that this "invalidation* of the notion of substance, as 
applied to material things, was an innovation with Berkeley. If one 
mat) speak in the terns of Aristotelian realism, once a philosopher 
holds the mind to know ideas and not "that which ‘is* primarily*^
(substances, or self-subsistent things), it is obvious that he must 
set up a frityt of reference to interpret reality which is quite 
different from the one Aristotle used. Descartes did not do this, 
although we have seen what he conceived to be the objects of knowl­
edge} with the result that his system, while aiming to ground realism 
more surely than had ever been done before, in faot produced a sub­
jectivism from which there was no escape, save by making speculation 
an adventure in supernatural faith. In this matter cf our knowledge
^Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 1, 1028alU.
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of the external world, Locke's criticism of Descartes m y  be looked
upon as haring brought only a substitution of faith in reason for
faith in God, Locke himself making a public confession of reason*s
inability to know anything but appearances (by which, as we hare
76
seen, he m ant the mind’s own ideas) with certainty# ?fow Berkeley,
speaking through Philonous, confesses t "I am of a vulgar cast, simple
77enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them”} and 
he could therefore wonder, in a celebrated passage, if all these 
difficulties are not manufactured} if we hare not "first raised a 
dust, and then complain, we cannot see"}7® if the seemingly total 
inadequacy of the mind to contact extramental reality, might not arise 
from a misconception, on the part of philosophers, of the nature of 
that reality#
To correct that long-standing misconception, and to describe 
the true nature of extramental reality, was the task Berkeley set 
himself j and this brings us to the second section of this chapter#
It is universally agreed, says our Bishop, that there exist ideas 
(the nature of which, as objects of perception, has just b en investi­
gated)} but it is obvious th t objects of perception, as such, cannot 
constitute the sum-total of realityj there mast also exist something 
else, something which perceives the objects as objects, and "exercises 
divers operations" about them* in a word, there must also exist a 
substance, a perceiving subject.
76Cf. Sssay. I?, ii, 1.
77Works, II, 229.
78Principles, "Introduction", 3.
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2* The Perceiving Subject 
Berkeley’s doctrine concerning Mind, Spirit, or Soul, la 
set forth briefly at the beginning of the Principles, ihere, immedi­
ately after haring stated what are the objects of knowledge, he con* 
aiders what must he the nature of the subjects
But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowl­
edge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, 
and exercises divers operations, as willing, Imagining, remembering 
about then* This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, 
spirit, soul or my self. By which words I do not denote any one 
of ay ideas, but a t'h'ing entirely distinct from them, wherein they 
exist, or, which is the ease thing, whereby they are perceivedj 
for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived*79
The being and nature of the mind, or qpixit, as it is here 
described, like the principle r egarding ideas as the objects of knowl­
edge, stands very much, in Berkeley's thought, in the character of a 
postulate* This view is supported by the judgment of C. R. Morris, 
who fails to find in Berkeley's writings anything approaching an 
adequate justification of the immediate knowledge the mind is said to 
have of itself*®0 Thus, in his study, Locke* Berkeley, Hume, he writes*
^ Principles. 2*
80In the Third Dial ogue, Philonous says* "ty own mind and ny 
own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of"* Works, H, 232* Berke­
ley considers knowledge of the soul to be "a 'knowledge without ideas,' 
an inner awareness of spiritual selfhood, a conscience*" (Luce, note 
to Phil* Coma** 230j in Works, I, 11?.) Cf* fee rfoW. 21t "percipientem, 
intelllgonie'ra, conscientia quadam interna cognovimus*" Works, IV, 16* 
Vide infra, k9* Thus ffcr, the soul's knowledge of itself is lanas- 
diatet Kui knowledge of ourselves is intimately bound up with knowledge 
of our ideast "We have an intuitive Knowledge of the Existence of other 
things besides our selves St even praecedaneous to the Knowlege [sic] of 
our own Existence, in that we mftst have Ideas or elm we cannot ' t'Kink." 
Phil. Coam., $lt7. Thus far, it is mediate * or inferential. It must be 
rme^erecT, however, th t Berkeley regards all objects of knowledge as
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He aeeras generally to assume in his writings that I have knowledge, 
immediate and infaL lible, of ay mind and its own states; that 
nothing happens in my mind of which I am unaware, or such that I 
misapprehend or even incompletely apprehend it. However, he never 
really goes into the subject at all adequately, and he never 
attempts to answer the obvious objections,8*
It oust be noted, however, that Berkeley does throw some light 
on the question when, in the Third Dialogue, fylas charges Philonous 
with inconsistency in denying Hatter, because he has no idea of it, 
while at the same tine affirming soul or spirit, of which he admits 
he has no idea. To this obj etion, Philonous replies that his main 
reason for denying Matter is not, that he has no idea of it, but be­
cause the only ides|be can have of it is inconsistent, and contains 
within itself a contradiction. Further, he raises the question of 
possible beings, and says that, to be possible, it is required that 
there be nothing inconsistent or "repugnant" in their definitions —  
which tells against Matter at oncej
immediately present to the understanding! spirits, no less than "real 
things" or "ideas*• The whole basis of his attack on the Cartesian and 
Lockean episteraologies was that they were "representational", and hence 
productive of "scepticism". Wien he says th t he has "a notion" of God, 
he means that Cod, as the object of his knowledge, is just as immediately 
present to his mind, as is "the idea" of a tree. "Corporeal phenomena”, 
as Professor Jessop remarks, "are not [i.e., for Berkeley] modes of any 
substance, but are wholly objects to a subject". Works, II, 12. The 
same must be true of the spiritual reality of which' wb have "notions", 
if the consistency of Berkeley's thought i t  to be maintained. In this 
connexion, the value of the "notion" is pragmatic, it is "a linguistic 
convenience" (as Professor luce callaTt) j any other interpretation 
would make nonsense out of Berkeley’s position. *fow the present writer 
does not pretend to justify this interpretation, nor even to understand 
how it can explain the fact of knowledge at all; but i t is advanced by 
many thinkers (among others, by the Ji shop’s present editors), and is 
certainly implied in all of Berkeley’1 statements on the question.
^Locko, Berkeley, Hume (London* Oxford University Press,
1931), 100i~ •
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fiat I have no reason for believing the existence of matter. I 
have no immediate intuition thereof* neither can I mediately from 
ay sensations* ideas* notions, actions or passions, infer an un­
thinking, unperceiving, inactive substance, either by probable 
deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of ny 
self, that is, ay own soul, mind or thlnkin; principle, I evi­
dently know by reflexion,... X have a notion of spirit, though 
I have not, strictly speaking, an iioa of it. I do not parcelv^ 
it as an Idea or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.
By making the mind's knowledge of itself indirect, and had by 
way of reflexion, Berkeley hae adopted the traditional philosophical 
solution of this pro blem. The Scholastic explanation is based on tie 
Aristotelian principle, operatlo sequitur esse; that if there is an 
activity observed, one may legitimately infer the existence of an 
agent. This, indeed, is the process rendered classic by Anaxagoras, 
when he declared the necessity of the Nous, or Hind, to explain the 
design, order, aid harmony of the material universe, which he held 
could not have resulted from chaotic matter alone. Coming nearer to 
Berkeley, this is the reasoning employed by Descartes in the famous 
coglto ergo sums he is conscious of an activity, and therefore argues 
to the existence of a being which is the author of it.
But Hylas is not content with this explanation) and in object­
ing that "in consequence of your own principles, it should follow 
that you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance
at
to support them", he virtually summarizes the position later main­
tained by Hume. How Philonous replies to this charge is ell the more
82Works. IX, 233.
83Cf. Principes do la Philosophic, I, 11,
further anT"adorably clear use of tifiis method, to 
origin of our ideas of sense must be in a Spirit.
8**Ibid., 233.
’tote Berkeley's 
demonstrate that the 
Works, II, 21*0.
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Interesting because Berkeley had himself once recorded it in language
of which Hume's formulation reads almost like a paraphrase.®^
£1 his reply, Philonous enlarges upon the process of reflexion,
in which he distinguishes consciousness of self, as an active, think*
ing, perceiving being, and the consciousness of the ideas with which
this self or mind is occupied) and he says*
How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of ny own 
being) and that I nqr self am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a 
thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills and oper­
ates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive 
both colours and sounds1 that a colour cannot perceive a sound, 
nor a sound a colours that I aa therefore one individual prin­
ciple, distinct from colour and sound) and, for the same mason, 
from all other sensible things and inert ideas.... Farther, I 
know what I mean, when I affirm that theie is a spiritual sub­
stance or support .of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and 
perceives ideas*®®
Uniting the principles which have so far been discussed, 
relating to our knowledge of ideas, and the knowledge the soul has 
of itself, a rather emphatic statement from the Commentaries indi­
cates that by these two, Berkeley is confident of having established 
an absolutely firm foundation for his system) for, boasting that he 
has escaped from the pitfall of scepticism, he writest
I am the farthest from Scepticism of any man* I know with an 
intuitive knowlege [sic 1 the existence of other things as well 
as ny own Soul, this Is wt Locke nor scarce any other Thinking 
Philosopher will pretend to.®7
^Compare Hume's denomination of the mind as a "bundle or 
collection of different perceptions" (Treatise of Human Nature* I, 
vi) with %t*y 580 of the Philosophical Commentaries, which reads t 
"Mind Is a congeries of Percepti ons. Yake away i-’erceptions & you take 
away the Mind put the Perceptions k you put the Mind." Works, I, 72*
fortes, II, 233-23U*
87
Philosophical Commentaries, 563.
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ffeving observed how Berkeley establishes to his own satis­
faction t e certainty of the knowledge the soul has of itself by 
reflexion, we can follow him to a consideration of our knowledge of 
the existence of the other substantial components of reality, God, and 
other finite spirits.
Here, it might be remarked, in recognition of the internal con­
sistency of his system, that the elements which Berkeley employs in 
his engenious demonstration of the existence of Ood, are those aLone 
which he has established in the elaboration of his doctrine of ideas 
and of the soul. It will be recalled that in section 6 of the Prin­
ciples, he declares thsfc "some truths there are so near and obvious 
to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them"5 and 
then, drawing the logical conclusions of the premisses he has laid 
down, he proceeds1
Such I take this Important one to be, to wit, that all the choir 
of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies 
which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any sub­
sistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or 
knownj that consequently so long as they are not actually per-
That Berkeley was fully cognizant of its ingenuity, and 
sought even (as it were) to "trade" upon the feet, may be Inferred 
from this passage in the Dialogues1 "that setting aside all help of 
astronomy and natural philosophy,all contemplation of the contri­
vance, order, and adjustment of things, an infinite mind should be 
necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world, 
is an advantage peculiar to them only who have made this easy re­
flexion t that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our 
several senses) and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside 
ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise 
than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the 
sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of dis­
course, oppose and baffle thefaost strenuous advocate for atheism.” 
Works. II, a2-213.
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ceived by met or do not exist In ray mind or that of any 
other created spirit, they must either have no existence at 
all, or else subsist in the ralnd of some eternal spiritt it 
being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absur­
dity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them 
an existence independent of a spirit.
Thus, in Berkeley's system, because the ideas of sense can 
be neither their own cause nor the cause of each other, since they 
are visibly passive and inert; because neither they, nor anything 
represented by them by way of image or likeness, can have any 
exltence apart from a mind perceiving them; because the mind is 
conscious of exercising no causal activity about them, and is passive 
in their reception; and because the only known cause of anything is 
mind, its activity being revealed in the power of willing and
go
imagining; 7 it therefore follows that they must exist in, and be 
caused in our minds by "some eternal spirit11 • So the essence of 
Bishop Berkeley's "direct and immediate demonstration, from a most 
evident principle", lies in thisi that the existence of our ideas of 
sense requires for their raison d * etre the existence of an eternal 
spirit, whom he calls God.
The first observation which must be made regarding this proof, 
Berkeley suggests himself when he says that these "idea-things" have 
three possible loci of inherencei my mind, the divine mind, and the 
minds of other created spirits. It might be contended that this third 
possible location, if admitted, would considerably weaken the proof 
for the existence of God, on condition that these other created
89
Principles. 28,
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spirits, the minds of other men, might be the cause of at least some 
of the ideas in my mind, and I, in turn, the cause of some in theirs• 
But this objection proves hardly to be worth considering, when it is 
pointed out that Berkeley*s account of the communication between 
finite spirits (which will be dealt with shortly) makes u4 no less 
absolutely dependent upon God for our knowledge of other men, than 
for our knowledge of inanimate Nature. Hence, for me to produce even 
the awareness of myself in the mind of another would require a pro*
on
cess akin to mental telepathy to effect. Furthermore, we know 
other minds by analogy with our own. There would thus appear to be 
no reason to suppose that they, any more than we, can originate 
ideas of sense; which on the contrary we receive quite passively.
let the ideas of sense must have a cause*— a cause which can 
91only be a spirit. There must therefore be a Spirit Who causes these
ideas in us, Whose power is not limited as is that of finite spirits.
Speaking as Philonous, Berkeley sayst
Thus I prove it [.this powerful being! to be spirit. Proa the 
effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because 
actions, volitions; and because there are volitions, there must 
be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, 
they or their archetypes, out of my mi nit but being ideas, neither 
they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an under­
standing! there is therefore an understanding. But will and 
understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. 
The powerful cause therefore of my ideas, is in strict propriety 
of speech a anlrlt.92
Not only the nature of what we perceive, but the very manner in
which it is possible for us to perceive it, further argues for the
Masieiss* H?.
91cf. ibid.. 26.
92Wo**I, II, 240,
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the existence of an intelligent (that is, spiritual or personal)
Cause, The ideas of sense enjoy a "privileged character* in re* 
lation to those of the imagination, which we ourselves producej they 
are presented to us with a steadiness, order and coherence quite un­
like the entirely random character of the effects of human villa.
They ooeur, in other words, "in a regular train or series, the ad­
mirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and
93benevolence of its Author," Moreover, the information with which
these ideas provide us also bears witness to their intelligent— and
perhaps we may now plainly say, their divine— source; for Berkeley
continues) "Bow the set rules or established methods, wherein the
mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the
Laws of Batura". To these he attaches what must pass in his system
for ultimate certitude regarding the basic principles by which the
9Z.
Individual should order his life* Finally, Berkeley leaves no 
doubt as to the origin of our ideas of sense and of the lavs of Nature 
(according to which the former are presented to our view) in a divine 
mind, when he sayst "This constant uniform working,..evidently displays
the goodness and wisdom of that governing spirit whose will constitutes
95the lews of Nature"} and again, when he begins the next section (33) 
of the Principles with) "The ideas imprinted on the senses by the 
Author of Nature are called real things...." The words of Philonous 
provide a fitting conclusion to his argument: "As sure therefore as the
93
Principles. 30.
£f. sect, 31.
95
Ibid.. 32.
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sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omni-
96present spirit who contains and supports it,"
Secondly, it may be observed that this doctrine of God, and
His role in human perception, provides Berkeley with a satisfactory
answer to one objection against the asse percird principle which,
If allowed to go unchallenged, would weaken rather considerably its
discoverer’s claim to be reckoned a serious philosopher. That
objection, which he discusses as the fourth argument which can be
urged against his system, has passed under the name of Intermitteney,
and is given here in Berkeley’s summary*
The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived! the 
trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, 
no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon
shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to no­
thing, and barely upon'opening them it is again created,97
Commenting upon this objection, Professor Luce remarks as
follows!
The objector urges that the New Principle,,,carries with it the 
’in and out’ existence of the objects of sense, because it makes 
their existence depend on the vagaries of my attention. There they 
are in front of me; the next moment they are gone to nothing; then 
back they come again; they have been recreated. This objection 
is no mere extravagance of thought, and Berkeley is right to deal 
tenderly with it. Many careful thinkers, scientists among them, do 
hold that colours, sounds, tastes, etc., do actually pass in and 
out of existence, that they are momentary existences, generated 
by the sense organ, which appear de nlhllo. and pass away. The 
matterist can fall back on matter. He points to it as the per­
manent behind these transient appearances. The lranaterialist, 
not having this resource, must either accept intermitteney and the 
doctrines which go with it, annihilation and perpetual re-creation, 
or he must give a new account,98
^Worka. II, 212.
^Principles, 45.
^Berkeley’s Immaterlalisa. 121. .
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As Professor Luce has indicated, Berkeley is careful to 
reject intermitteney, and in this connexion, makes "one of bis few
99
explicit statements*..on the all-important question of the perceivable."
He sayst
Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind,
1 would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, 
but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the 
foregoing principles, that bodies are annihilated and created 
every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our 
perception of them**0®
While even at this point he does not enlarge upon his rejection of 
this false interpretation, Berkeley would seem to have answered it 
clearly enough already when, in section 6, he explicitly includes 
"the mind of some eternal spirit* among the implicitly comprehensive 
“all minds whatsoever" specified above*
Connected with self-knowledge, and knowledge of Cod, is the 
manner in which we come to khov other human minds, or created spirits, 
the existence of other men, he declares to be less evidently perceived 
than the existence of Cod, and justifies this bold statement in the 
act of indicating the way in which we know our fellow creatures.
Our knowledge of the existence of God rests upon the "effects of 
Nature*, which, as Berkeley has concluded, He alone has the power to 
Impress upon us; and these "are infinitely more numerous and con­
siderable, than those ascribed to human agents". He then continuest 
There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect pro-
"ibid.. 120. .
^Principles. 48.
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duced by him, which doth not more strongly evince the being 
of that spirit who is the Author of Mature* For it is evident 
that in affecting other persons, the will of man hath no 
other object, than barely the motion of the limbs of his body} 
but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any 
idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the 
Creator. He alone it is who upholding all things by the Word 
of his Fewer, maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby 
they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet 
this pure and clear light which enlightens every one, is it self 
invisible*^
What is most significant about this singular account of the 
communication of created spirits} what brings us up short, in the 
realisation that it is "spirits® in the full and literal sense of the 
word, that Berkeley is discussing} and what therefore is most deserving 
of comment, is that, consistent with all that he has said concerning 
the ego and the non-ego, the nature and functions of the soul, and 
the character of perceived reality, Berkeley resorts here to a theory 
which almost exactly parallels one by which Scholastic thinkers 
explain the manner of communication of souls separated from their 
bodies after death. The separated soul, in this state, being de­
prived of the use of the bodily organs of sensation, is no longer 
capable of receiving data through them, aid therefore has nothing 
from which to abstract Intelligible species. It is thus impossible 
for it to gain any new knowledge in the natural way. If the soul 
is to progress in knowledge at all, God must be looked upon to pro­
vide directly such new intelligible species as the soul receives} and
^Principles. H7.
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in this way knowing, after death, takes on a partially miraoulous
might be remarked here that, in his anxiety to banish the unintelligible 
and atheistical from reality, Berkeley would seem, at least in this 
particular, to have driven the natural out of Nature; and in his 
care not to multiply being beyond necessity, he has not hesitated to 
multiply miracles. In terms of his own realism, however, he has 
simply stated the logical consequence of his doctrine of ideas and of 
the divine causality in our knowledge of the sensible universe.
One other passage from the Principles might be cited to 
clarify his meaning in this matter of man's knowledge of his fellows, 
and to show the consistency of his teaching on how particular spirits 
appear to us, with his opinions concerning the rest of perceivable
A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not 
being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, 
aid motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or 
ideas excited in our own minds* and these being exhibited to our 
view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us 
the existence of finite and created spirits like our selves.
Heme It is plain, we do not see a man, if by man is meant that 
which lives, moves, perceives, aid thinks as we dot but only such 
a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is 
a distinct principle of thought aid motion like to our selves, 
accompanying aid represented by it,l°3
This passage recalls the statement in the opening section of 
the Principles already quoted, in which it is said that *as several of 
these [ideas of sense] are observed to accompany each other, they come
character.102 From the point of view of Aristotelian realism, it
reality*
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. I, q. 89, especially
a. 1 ad 3, aid a. 3*
103MMMsg> MS.
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to bo marked by one name, and ao to be reputed as one;thing*. So 
does man know nan by means of an ensemble of perception* vhleh 
habitually accompany eaoh other} ao, too, can nan be said to know 
Godt
In a strict aenae, I do not aee Alciphron, I.e. that individual 
thinking thing, but only aueh visible signs and tokens as suggest 
and infer the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul. 
Even so, In the self-same manner, it seems to ne that, though I 
cannot with the eyes of flesh behold the invisible God, yet I do 
In the strictest sense behold and perceive by all my senses aueh 
signs and tokens, such effects and operations, as suggest, indieate, 
and demonstrate an invisible God, as certainly, and with the ease 
evidence, at least, as any other signs pereelved by sens* do sug­
gest to as the existence of your soul, spirit, or thinking prin­
ciple... .104
God is known in much the sane way as non are) and yet there is a 
differences
Whereas sone one finite and narrow assenblage of ideas denotes 
a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do 
at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the 
divlnitys every thing we see, hear, feel, or any wise perceive 
by sense, being a sign or effeet of the Power of God) as is our 
perception of those very motions, which are produced by m*n.l°5
Thus in Berkeley1s view, the fact of our knowledge of other men is
in Itself an effect of the power of God, and points an index to His
existence.
There remains to be considered, last of all, the naans by 
which knowledge of spirits —  which is to say, of substances —  
can take placet Berkeley1 a doctrine of notions, *A spirit”, the 
Bishop consents,
IT, 5i In Merit.. III. 147.
Prlnclpl... 14s.
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1* on* simple, undivided, active being* as it perceives ideas, it 
is sailed the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise 
operates about them, it is called the will. Hence there can be 
no idea formed of a soul or spirit* for all ideas whatever, 
being passive and inert, vide Sect. 25, they oannot repre­
sent unto us, by way of inage or likeness, that uhleh acts....
Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it can­
not be of it self perceived, but only by the effects which it 
produeeth....Though it must be owned at the same time, that 
we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the 
mind, such as willing, loving, hating, in as much as we know or 
understand the meaning of those words."*®
Elsewhere, he adds these further precisions*
We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, 
an! that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have 
some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and 
active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas.
In like manner we know and have a notion of relations between 
things or ideas, whioh relations are distinct from the ideas 
or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us 
without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, 
spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the 
object of human knowledge and the subject of discourse* and that 
the term idea would be improperly extended to signify every 
thing we know or have any notion of. ^*7
Knowledge of the mind and "ideas or things" is said to be 
"intuitive",*®® "immediate"}*®7 "ideas, spirits and relations" 
are classed together as "the object of human knowledge"} "to know" 
and "to have a notion of" are used as synonymous phrases. These 
are the reasons, it would appear, which have prompted Professor 
Luce to conclude that the notion, in Berkeley's system, is "neither 
a concept, nor a cognitive tertlun quid, but simply a linguistic 
convenience denoting an active, spiritual object of apprehension,
106Prlnolples. 27.
*®7Ibld.. 89.
M M I .  Cow... 563.
109
Third Dialogue between Hvlas and Philonous. Works. II, 232.
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as distinct from a passive idea." Tha tara itsalf was intro­
duced into his epis$emology to dasignata "tha aantal as object"*111 
to explain our knowledge of ourselves, othar finita spirits, God, 
and relations —  that is* non-sensible reality —  of which it is 
impossible to hare any idsas of sense. The existence of thasa 
objeota of knowledge, the mind (as has boon seen) infers. after 
working on certain groupings of the ideas of sense. let knowledge 
of them can be said to be Immediate, because when it is had, there 
is nothing which interposes itself between the mind and the spirit 
(or relation) whioh is known. Any other interpretation of the 
function of "notions" in his systen would soon to shackle 
Berkeley to tha representational theory of knowledge which ha 
so penetratingly condemned in Looks, and which he held himself 
to have escaped* We have notions. therefore, of tha constituents
of intelligible, non-sensible reality, "in as much as we know or
112understand the meaning” of the words which signify them to us.
In another connexion, too, it would appear that Thonas
Reid, and such modern critics of Berkeley1 s isnaterlalisn as
113A. D. Lindsay and Sydney C. Rome (not to mention Dr. G. A. John-
^"fhe Alleged Development of Berkeley’s Philosophy", Mind.
U l  (1943), 147.
Ill
a s m ,  II, 53, note 1.
^Principles. 27. g£. sects. 139-140, and especially 142.
n %£* 4„te,lfesssa M3.pg9By.gtl
writings, hv George Berkeley Ac., with introduction by A. D. Lindsay 
(Londont Dent, 1914), xxiii-xxiv.
114 ,■Berkeley’s Conceptualism", Philosophical Review. LV (1946),
680-686.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
ston, with whose opinions we are acquainted only at second hand) have 
to some extent misconceived the value Berkeley attributed to the term 
"notion", when they argue, as for example Sydney Rome does, that 
"if there are ease objects of sense which do not exist as sensations,
115
they oould be known nationally") and then go on to apply that
conclusion to Berkeley's denial of material substance. Matter,
Berkeley declared, was useless, meaningless, impossible, the
ll6seat of "contradictions and repugnancies") it was the closest
thing to non-entity —  to a complete absence of being —  that
could be brought before the mind by any "spurious or adulterine
117method" of reasoning.' It, and any supposed world it might corn-
118pose, were completely inconceivable and unknowable. He therefore
concluded —  and this, after all, is what his doctrine of immaterialism
means on its negative side —  that matter was unknowable because it 
litwas Impossible) could not be known, because it oould not be —  
because there sinply was nothing to know. Whatever can be sensed, 
and whatever is necessarily Implied by the fact of sensation, Berkeley 
will allow to be realt but he can find no place for a material world here) 
and notional knowledge, though it shows us the intelligible, possible part 
of non-sensible reality, can be of no help in establishing contact with 
such supposed aspects of that reality as are plainly unintelligible 
and impossible. For this reason, too, though he may seem to disparage
n6Cf. Principles. 68, 69, 72, 76. 
P^rinciples, 78.
^  Ibid.. 686.
U7Cf. Siris. 317.
119
Cf. Works, n, 233-23U.
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the value of eense-knowledge (upon vhloh he plaees such reliance 
in the early works we are studying) In the Slrla and ascribe 
to non-sensible objects of knowledge the greatest degree of reality, 
this ean be to reason to suppose in hin a ehanged attitude towards 
matter. This, he always insisted, could newer be known by the 
sensesi but neither could it be reasoned to from the existence of 
the objects of sense-knowledge. When the Siris denies to sensation 
the same value which the early works accord it, the way is not opened 
for knowledge of the unknowable. It is the reality of the non-sensible 
intelligible, not the non-sensloal unknown (if we may echo a phrase 
of Professor luce's) that he affirms} and to Interpret his thought 
otherwise would seem to entail a manifest distortion of it. This 
appears to clarify, at least in so far as we need to examine it, 
the relationship which exists between his later philosophy, and all 
that is most "Berkeleian* in his early thoughti and would seen to 
indicate that the so-called Platonism of the Siris is not ineom-
120
Of. Siris. 264, 293-296, and 303 in particular. In connexion 
with this, it is well to note that in section 353 of Siris. Berkeley re­
affirms the thought of section 1 of the Principles, with regard to the 
purely "artificial* composition of "things", when he sayst "In things 
sensible and imaginable, as such, there seems to be no unity, nothing 
that ean be called one, prior to all actr slot of the mind} since they, 
being in themselves aggregates, consisting of ports or compounded of ele­
ments, are in effect many. Accordingly, it is remarked by Themistius, the 
learned interpreter of Aristotle, that to collect many notions into one, 
and to consider them as one, is the work of intellect, and not of sense 
or fancy.* Mote the differences in vocabularyt sensible things are no 
longer said frankly to be composed of "ideas", but rather of "parts" and 
•elements". However, if the whole of the perceivable universe is entirely 
analysable into collections of sense-data, or "ideas" —  and nowhere in 
Siris does Berkeley deny this to be so —  there is no reason to suppose 
that he has abandoned the early basis of his immeterialism, or that the 
"differences in vocabulary" to be found in his later writings are any , 
more than just that. gf. luce, "The Unity of the Berkeleian Philosophy (II.)",
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petible with the imnaterlalism of tho Principles.
This view of the relation of Siris to the rest of Berkeley's
philosophical output (which is also shared by A. A. Luce and T. 2.
Jessop) is vary well expressed by Frederick J, S. Woodbridge, who
states the ease as followst
Siris is taken by Fraser to represent Berkeley's philosophy in 
its later development. It is certainly a later expression of it 
and a fuller exposition of it on the spiritual side. But X do 
not find that the position taken in the earlier writings is modi­
fied in any significant way. What we find is his own philosophy 
reflected against the philosophy of the past. In the earlier 
writings he has his contemporaries in Kind and to then he is 
opposed* The Siris exhibits the non with whom he was sympathetic* 
It is this antagonism and this sympathy which should be joined 
together in any attempt to estimate him in the light of his own 
contemporary interests* from this point of view his philosophy 
appears as simple and clear as he contended**"
In the proceeding sections, the two fundamental principles 
of Berkeley's philosophy have been discussed! that objects exist 
which are known, and which philosophers call "ideas*} and that 
therefore, there must exist mind, spirit, soul or self which knows
Bote A) Mind. m i  (1937), 187-188. g|* also Siris. 316, where Plato 
is quoted to the effect that "sensible qualities...exist (though not 
originally) in the soul, and there only".
Sections 311, 312, 317 and 318 of Siris may be taken 
(among others) to confirm this views for in them,Berkeley shows 
that even the classical defenders of matter held more reasonable 
views on the subject, than do the Mechanists against whom he is 
arguing.
^"Berkeley's Baalism", in ..ffjfftfflaM >
X, 214* Professor Luce toe answered critics of this position, and 
marshalled evidence for it, both internal and external, in three 
articles! "The Bnity of the Berkeleian Philosophy* (in two sectionsi 
HffX (1937), 44*52, 180-190), and "The Alleged Development of 
Berkeley's Philosophy" (Mind. LII (1943), 140-156).
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these "ideal* objects. In the remaining sections of this ohapter, 
the conclusions which he draws as the necessary consequences of these 
principles will he considered! both of them are concerned with the 
denial of matter} hut the first relates specifically to the meaning 
of "existence"•
3* The Meaning of "Existence"
We come now to consider what, in his own opinion seems likely
12?to hare been the most inportant,^ and what, in history, has become 
the most famous, phrase that Berkeley ever pennedi esse is perclpl.
The doctrine which It summarises —  that for perceivable things to be, 
they must be perceived —  was meant to oppose the doctrine that there 
are beings which enjoy a material existence independent of any mind) 
and, by one of those paradoxes which are not uncommon in the realm 
of speculation, Berkeley found its essential basis in the writings 
of "a late deservedly esteemed philosopher", John Locke, who was, 
after Newton, perhaps the foremost contemporary English exponent of 
the "absolute existence" of things. Locke had drawn a clear dis­
tinction between substance as it Is in itself, and substance as it 
is known to us, and had expressed himself thus on the subject in his
entry 1*91 of the Commentaries, which reads as followst 
"Mem Diligently to set forth how that many of the Ancient philosophers 
run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion and 
those other things they perceiv’d actually by their senses, this sprung 
from their net knowing w* existence was..., His on the Discovering of 
the nature St meaning k import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This 
puts a wide difference betwixt the Sceptics & me. This 1 think wholly 
new. I am sure His new to ms." Cf. entry 279. [We haua taken the liberty, 
hare mid dsewhese, of quoting the text of tha Commentaries exactly as it 
is given in Professor Luce’s edition.3
12k
Principles, "Introduction", 11.
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Bssagt
It it the ordinary qualities observable in iron or a diamond, 
pat together, that makes the true complex idea of those substanoes, 
which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows beteer than a philo­
sopher) 't/bo, whatever substantial fores he M y  talk of, has no 
other idea of those substances than Shat is frsasd by a collection 
of these staple ideas which are to be found in them. Only we must 
take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all these 
simple ideas they art made up of, have always the confused idea of 
something to which they belong, and in which they subsisti and there­
fore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing 
having such or such qualities) as, body it * thing which is extended, 
figured, and capable of motion) spirit, a thing capable of thinking) 
and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are 
qualities to be found in a loadstone. These and the like fashions 
of speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always some­
thing besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or 
othar observable ideas, though we do not know what it is*12?
This, than, is Locke's description of external things as thay
are known by ust various collections of sensed qualities, to each of which
we nevertheless add "the confused idea" of a substratum in which those
qualities inhere, "because we cannot conceive how thay should subsist alone,
nor in one another."12^ Tet he was not satisfied with this notion of
substance, regarding it as obscure and vague, and remarking that we
have no idea of what substance is, "but only a confused obscure one of
what it doee".*^ Re could even wonder "of what use [it is] in deciding
questions in philosophy".**®
In the light of these statements, it is interesting to read in
•^ Sassy concerning Human Dnderstanding, n, xxiii, 3. 
U 6 Ibid., sect. U.
127Ibld.. mill, 19.
128Ibid., sect. 20. Cf. James Gibson. Locke's Theory of Know 
ledge and llslutorlcal Rcla&oaa (Cambridge, "OTT), O T . -------
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section 31 of Berkeley's Principles what amounts to an echo of Looked
difficulty, and the approach to a solution of his problem} for here,
it is shown that modern philosophers, in seeking to explain sensible
phenomena in terms of the mechanical motion of a material substance,
are faced with the difficulty of holding for the separate existence
of prime matter. "I cannot but remark*, says Berkeley,
how Marly this vague and indeterminate description of matter or 
corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into 
by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and much ridi­
culed notion of materia prime, to be met with in Aristotle and his 
followers,
Part of the solution Berkeley offers lies in pointing out an historical
parallel} for the rest, he suggests a correction of Locke's doctrine,
and turns to common senses
There is a Philosopher who says we can get an idea of substance 
by no way of Sensation or Reflection. & seems to imagine that ve 
want a sense proper for it, CSo Locke, in his Bssav. 1, iv, 18.3 
Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new Idea, now 
I suppose he will not say substance according to him is an Idea, 
for ray port I own I have no Idea can stand for substance in his or 
y® Sehoolmen*s sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar 
sense & then ve see & feel substance.*29
There, according to Berkeley, lies the answert "substance...taken in the
130
vulgar sense, for a combination of sensible qualities". Locke himself 
(as ve have just seen) held that all that can really be known of a self- 
subsistent being are its accidental modifications} but he added to this 
"oommonsense* notion of substance the "impossible* note of "unknown 
substratum*. and in so doing, posed what Berkeley considers to be a 
false problemt he complains of being ignorant of the material substratum 
of sensible qualities, yet he has no real assurance that such a substratum
^Phll. Comm.. 72A. l30Princlnles. 37.
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exist*. From this problem, Berkeley sees but one escapet to show that,
even if sash a substratum could exist, ve could neither know it, nor
find any conceivable use for it. He proposes to demtastrate that Looks,
on his cun principles, has no reason to suppose the existence of a
world of material substances; and to do this, he thinks it sufflcent
to examine the nature of the objects of sense!
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that 
houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects 
have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being per­
ceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and 
acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the 
vorldi yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, 
may, if 1 mistake act, perceive it to involve a manifest contra­
diction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things 
ve perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own 
ideas or sensations) and Is it not plainly repugnant that any one 
of these or any combination of then should exist unperceivod ?^ 31
Bov Locke might have held that the objects of sense are ideas, 
and that sensible objects (at least in so far as our knowledge of then 
is concerned) are combinations of sensible qualities; but he would 
not have agreed with the conclusion which Berkeley drew from these 
premisses. By making the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, Locke could say that we know a thing only as a collection 
of simple ideas existing in the mlnd,^2 and still attribute to the 
things thus perceived an external, material existence. How Berkeley 
early speaks of the primary and secondary qualities. "By the former", 
he tells us, modem philosophers "mean extension, figure, motion, 
rest, solidity or impenetrability and number! by the latter they denote all 
other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth.
13*Trlnolplea. 4. 13%|. Bssav. II, xxiii, 1.
133
Principles. 9.
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These latter, according to the philosophers, are entirely subjective, 
and are not considered as resemblances of anything without the mind.
This doctrine Berkeley accepts} but other thinkers err* according to 
him, when they insist that the ideas of primary qualities are "patterns 
or Images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking sub­
stance which they call matter.
Berkeley’s reduction of the ideas of the primary qualities to 
the status of those of the secondary, need not be considered at greater 
length here (although we shall return to it again}• It is enough to 
recall his rejection of the supposed representative character of the 
ideas of sense, his subsequent identification of them with real things, 
and his account of their origin in a divine instrumentality. Once it 
is granted that we perceive perceptions, or the ideas of sense, and 
that collections of these constitute real things, it is logically im­
possible that our ideas should lead us to a knowledge of anything 
alnllar beyond themselves, for tin reality they present is complete 
in itself. Such, at least, seems to be Berkeley’s argument in section 
13 of the Principlesi
The table I write on, I say,exists, that is, I see and feel it} 
and if I were out of my study I should say It existed, meaning 
thereby that if 1 was in my study I might perceive it, or that 
some other spirit actually does perceive it* There was an odour, 
that is, it was smelled} there was a sound, that is to say, it 
was heard} a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or 
touch. This is all that 1 can understand by these and the like expres­
sions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of un­
thinking things without any relation to their being perceived, 
that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is per dpi, nor
^M S-
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is it possible thsy should have any existence, out of the 
■lads or thinking things vhleh perceive then.
This is Berkeley's definition of "existence", as predicated 
of real things, or the objects of sense) and vhen he draws the con­
clusion logically implied in it, he makes manifest the absurdity to 
which the philosophy of Ms own day had already reduced the use, in 
this connexion, of the traditional primary category of substanoe, 
which is at bottoa the philosophical basis of the affirmation of 
an external, material world, possessing existence independent of 
the nind. thus, he concludes section 7 of the Principlesi
Bow for an idea to exist in an unpereelving thing, is a mani­
fest contradiction} for to have an idea is all one as to perceives 
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities 
exist, must perceive theas hence it is clear there can be no 
unthinking substanoe or substratum of those ideas.
the key to his teaching in this particular is to be found in 
his celebrated condemnation of "abstract general ideas", and the role 
they have hitherto been supposed to play in human knowledge. While 
it would take us too far afield to consider the whole of his attack on 
Lockean abstraction in all its particulars, this must be examined in 
so far as it bears upon his doctrine of substanoe.
In his condemnation of abstract ideas, Berkeley discusses the 
association of words, thoughts, and things. How in the Aristotelian and 
Scholastic treatment of this question (to which allusion has been made 
in a previous section), the principle that "words are signs of thoughts 
and thoughts are similitudes of things* reelcves its meaning from the 
doctrine of abstraction) for it is held that the thought (or the content 
of a concept), produced as the result of abstraction, renders present to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
the intellect the nature or essence, which makes the particular
thing which is known, to be what it is. Hence, that thought has
a universal significance* for whenever I know a man, be he actual
or possible, living or dead, black or white, it is the sans nature
which is rendered present to ngr understanding in the concept. The
word, therefore, which is an arbitrary symbol of the nature which is
know in the concept, also has a universal significance, and can be
135applied to all the particular things which possess that nature.
This last, Berkeley refused to grant t but not, it would appear, 
because he failed to realise the function of the universal both in 
knowing and in nesting, but rather because of the form he understood 
the universal * thoughts* to take, and the process by which he 
believed then to be produced.
Beginning with words, Berkeley points out that it is in a 
misunderstanding of the function of language in the knowing pro­
cess, that the origin of all the errors flowing from the doctrine of 
abstract ideas is to be foundt
The truth of this appears from other reasons, so also from the 
plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who 
acknowledge that they are made in order to naalngf from which it 
is a clear consequence, that if there had been no such thing as 
speech or universal signs, there never had been any thought of 
abstraction.*3®
Choosing Looks as the "ablest patron" of abstract ideas, 
on the basis of whose statements the doctrine must be refuted,
135££. S. Thomas Aquinas, op. clt.. 1, q. 85, a. 2 in reference 
to the whole paragraph.
^ Srinelplea. "Introduction", 18.
137
As is clear from the numerous references in the "Introduction" 
to the Principles to Locke’s Essay.
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Berkeley proceeds to examine more closely the way la which words
have contributed to establish this error in Mthe thoughts of
speculative men"i
First then, His bought that every name hath, or ought to have, 
one only precise and settled signification, which inclines sen 
to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas, which 
constitute the true and only immediate signification of each 
general aaae. And that it is by the mediation of these abstract 
ideas, that a general nans cones to signify any particular thing. 
Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and 
definite signification annexed to any general naae, they all 
signifying Indifferently a great number of particular ideas....
To this it trill be objected, that every name that has a 
definition, is thereby restrained to one certain signification.
For example, a M m & t  defined to be a plane surface com­
prehended by three right linest by which that name is limited 
to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, 
that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be 
great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long 
or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are in­
clined to each otherj in ail which there may be great variety, 
and consequently there is no one settled Idea which limits the 
signification of the word triangle. »Tis one thing for to keep 
a naae constantly to the same definition, and another to sake 
it stand every where for the same idea* the one id necessary,
the other useless and impracticable.
From this account, it is apparent that Berkeley has no ob­
jection to nominal universale, and is arguing only against the sup­
posed existence, in the mind, of universal "ideas"t all of which has 
no bearing on his doctrine of substance. One thing only is of 
interest* and that is his account of how these presumed abstractions 
are said to be formed. His condemnation has had to be studied, simply 
because of this particular aspect of it* and it is only to place it in 
its setting, that Berkeley has been allowed to explain the terms of
^Principles. "Introduction", 18.
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his condemnation at such length. Specifically, it ia not hie re­
jection of vhat he understood to he the product of abstraction, 
but rather his rejection of the process of abstraction itself, 
which links the thought of the "Introduction" to the Principles. 
to the thought of the rest of that vork, and which illuminates his 
frequent references to the "supposed existence of material substance", 
or to the distinguishing, in the objects of sense, a twofold existence 
("the one intelligible, or ill the mind, the other Ilfii and without the 
aind"^'^), as "nice strains of abstraction".^*5
Seising upon Locke's description of the abstraot idea of tri­
angle as a pre-eminent example of all that he opposed as false and 
misleading in modem philosophy, he takes it as a self-evident fact 
that, if Locke's words are to be interpreted literally, not only has he 
never had an abstraot idea, but does not even have the power to eoneeive 
one. To prove his point, he has only to appeal to his reader
to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he 
has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with 
the description that is here given of the general idea of a trj- 
m t e *  which is, neither oblique, nor rectangle, equilateral, ecul- 
fiiasEaLuiss. .mtimm*. .ttMudLiMk***
This is the reduotio ad absurdum. "the killing blow".^ Obviously, 
it is the "tacking together numberless inconsistencies" (as he puts it 
in a delightfully characteristic passage in seotion 14 of the "Intro­
duction") that constitutes, ia his view, "abstraction" as it has been 
traditionally conceived) and it is this, which, having been allowed a
maalDl.». 86. Ibid.. 5.
., "Introduction", 13. ^Phll. Coma.. 687.
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dominant role la so many previous discussions of knowledge, had intro­
duced a plainly Irrational spirit late philosophy. This irrational 
spirit, Berkeley sat himself to opposa la all his philosophising* 
especially, as we have saaa ia M s  affirmtion of spiritual sub- 
staaea, and his dsaial of the material. That tha saw opposition is 
manifested hara, oan ha further saaa froa the way la vhiah ha states 
his opinion eonoern the "true* abstraotioa vhioh tha nlnd is really 
capable of performing*
For ay self Z find indeed Z have a faculty of imagining, or 
representing to ay self tha ideas of those particular things Z 
hava perceived and of variously compounding and dividing than.
Z oan imagine a man with two heads or tha upper parts of a man 
joined to the body of a horse. Z can consider the hand, the 
eye, tha nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from tha 
rest of the body.... To be plain, Z own myself able to abstract 
in one sense, as when Z consider sons particular parts or qualities 
separated from others, with which though they are united in soae 
object, yet, it is possible they nay really exist without then.
But Z deny that Z can abstract one from another, or eoaselve 
separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist 
so separated) or that Z can frame a general notion By abstracting 
from particulars in the maimer aforesaid. Which two last are the 
proper acceptations of abstraction.^*
By advancing this "improper" acceptation of "abstraction", 
Berkeley knowingly chains it entirely to the imagination, and would 
appear to limit the operations of abstraction which can be performed
about the human body (to elaborate upon the example he himself gives
above) to those which an anatomist might perform on his dissecting-
table. Whether this constitutes a valuable contribution to epistem-
ology, or whether it indicates a misunderstanding of the doctrines it 
was want to correct, it is not actually necessary to consider here.
^'^Prinololca. "Introduction", 10.
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The whole significance of the attack on abstraot ideas, and that in
vhioh it concerns hie doetrine of substance, lies in his denial that
what eannot exist separately in re. oan be ooneeived as existing
separately in thought; and In his insistence that what is inpossible,
or is by definition composed of "inconsistencies" or "repugnancies",
can ewer be the object of more than "spurious" knowledge. Thus,
Berkeley1 s refusal to admit the validity of the prooess, or the
reality of any product, of "abstraction", whether it be an idea of
triangle which is at once all triangles and no triangle, or a
perceivable universe ooneeived as existing unperceived, can be
regarded as the characteristic reaction of a scandalised common
sense, hastening to affirm the primacy and regulative function of
the principle of Identity in human knowledge. If man's primary,
primordial certitude is limited to the knowledge that he has a mind
which knows ideas (which is surely the lesson Berkeley learned from
Descartes's and Locke's philosophies), then is it not lsgitemate to
conclude that what cannot be thought, eannot exist? And if the
sceptic objects that beyond thought, there may lie a reality which
is sons the less real for being unknowable, do not the words of the
oonverted Hylae, spoken at the end of the Third Dialogue, constitute
a fitting answer?
There is nothing we either desire or shun, but as it makes, or is 
apprehended to make some part of our happiness or misery. But what 
hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do 
with absolute existence, or with unknown entitles, abstracted from 
all relation to us? It is evident, things regard us only as they 
are pleasing or displeasing! and they oan please or displease, only 
so far forth as they are perceived. Farther therefore we are not
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If there is a world of matter, why need we ever be concerned 
with it? Ve own "sit down in a forlorn scepticism", bemoaning, on 
the basis of hardly more than groundless rumours, our fanoied ignorance
of "ve know not what"} but ve do so at the risk of wasting our lives
14,5in meaningless, profitless dreaming. Ve are free to choose} but 
he who aeeepts the given ideal reality at its faoe value, and rejects 
material substanoe as an obstacle to the attainment of truth which 
explains nothing and obscures much, will be found, in Berkeley's 
opinion, to have chosen wisely.
4, ffqhstjnsfJfe,,Sitig&sA
In this investigation of Berkeley's notion of substance, there
remains to be considered one last point> his affirmation that there
can be only one "species* of substance, namely, spirit. It is apparent
that this doctrine has been implied in everything that has gone beforet
for his account of the perceived object, the perceiving subject, the
divine instrumentality which links the two, and his definition of
existence, have all been elaborated purely in the realm of spirit,
leaving matter excluded and useless from the point of view both of
being and of knowing. Commenting on this, Professor Luce sayst
Thus, quietly, methodically, and without naming matter Berkeley 
builds up Ids argument and makes the notion of immaterialisn 
'steal unawares on the reader.* Be shows us, as it were, an air 
graph of the perceptual situation} here are its factors, the 
sensible object, the sentient subject, and God. If that be the 
full account, then there is no need if or.material substance, or 
room for it} matter's occupation's gone.1^ ®
14.5££* Principles. "Introduction", 1-3.
346
Berkeley's Immatcrlallam. 38.
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As might ho expected, the first time this view appears as an 
oxpliolt statement, is in section 7 of tha Principles when, after 
haring set forth the terns of the proposition as just described, he 
draws the conclusion they require, and writesi "From what has been 
said, it follows, there is not any other substanoe than spirit, or 
that which perceives," Here, it would seen appropriate to follow 
Berkeley ia his examination of the fonotioas commonly assigned to 
matter by those who take it as a presupposition in their systens, 
and to see why he regards it, even on these principles, as an il­
logical and entirely unnecessary addition. The chief of these 
functions, and the first he undertakes to refute, is that of 
substratum of the primary qualities I extension, figure, motion, rest, 
solidity or impenetrability, and number. The Matterists,'^ he says,
will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or 
images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking 
substance which they call natter. By matter therefore ve are to 
understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, 
figure, and notion, do actually subsist.*#
Bov "they [the MatteristsJ take [it] for an undoubted truth" 
that secondary qualities exist only ia the mind) but Berkeley points 
out that, in our perception of them, the primary qualities are in­
separably united with the secondary} where the one group is, therefore, 
the other grotq? must be alsot and he resorts, by way of final demon­
stration, to a favourite appeal to personal reflexion!
'^"Batteriste*! the term Professor Luce uses to designate "all 
thinkers who believe in the existence of matter, whatever their views
on mind and spirit". Ibid.. 2$, note 1.
U S
Brinolples. 9.
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But X desire any one to refleet and try, whether he oan by 
any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion 
of any body, without all the other sensible qualities...*
Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must 
these be also, to wit, in the mind and no where else.'1*?
Proceeding then to a discussion of the primary qualities 
individually, he begins with extension and motion, and observes that 
"great and small, swift and slow" are granted by his opponents as 
existing only in the mind, "being entirely relative, and changing 
as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies." Neverthe­
less, they claim that there exist without the mind absolute exten­
sion, whleh "is neither great nor small"j and absolute motion 
which "is neither swift nor slow". These are "extension in general" 
and "motion in general", and he discusses them as manifest impos­
sibilities, already refuted in his denial of "that strange doctrine 
of abstract ideas." lastly, he concludes*
Without extension solidity cannot be conceived} since there­
fore it hath been shewn that extension exists not in an un­
thinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.
In subsequent sections of the Principles. Berkeley similarly 
disposes of the arguments in favour of matter founded upon number and 
unity, showing the first to be "entirely the creature of the mind"
(in section 12), and the second to be avowedly an abstract idea 
(in section 13).
Saving thus demonstrated that only by means of invalid ab­
straction can tiie primary qualities be conceived apart, or separated 
from the secondary} and having, by this reduction of the former to the
U 9Ibld., 10. l50Ibld., 11.
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subjective status of tbs latter, deprived natter of anything to
support, he next proceeds to inquire into the meaning of the word
“support* itself* Quoting "the most accurate philosophers
as admitting that, by “notarial substanoe”, they asan “the idea
of being in general, together with the relative notion of its
supporting accidents*, he declares the phrase to be meaninglessj
for the idea of being ia general appears to his “the most abstraot
and incomprehensible of all other*" and since "supporting aeeidents"
eannot be taken in a litoral sense, there is no way of knowing what
the words mean* The phrase
must therefore be taken in some other sense [than the common one], 
but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the 
two parts or branches whieh make the signification of the words 
material substance. X an convinced there can be no distinet meaning 
annexed to then*™2
All that this expression oan lead to in the way of explanation, is the
supposition that sensible qualities oan exist without the mind) vhioh,
as we have seen, is for Berkeley “a direct repugnancy, and altogether
inconceivable
But in a spirit of fairness to the upholders of the opposing 
doctrine, let us suppose, says Berkeley, that bodies, or material 
substances, do exist outside the mind* The question is, how oan we 
know them. Either it must be by sense, or by reason. Now they can­
not be known by the senses, for by these "we have the knowledge only
151
Chief amongst idiom is Lockei vide Works. IX, A8, mite 1*
152firinolplea* 17.
153
JbU'
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of our sensation*, idea*, or those thing* that are immediately per­
ceived by sense", vhlch"do not infora us that thing* exist without 
the mind, or unperceived, like to those vhioh are perceived." This, 
he finds, "the materialists themselves acknowledge". Apparently, 
then, knowledge of the external world must be had by reason, which 
infers from what Is perceived the existence of what is not perceived. 
But this Inference Is declared to be impossible, again on the 
principles of "the very patron* of matter themselves", who "do not 
pretend, there is any necessary connexion" between external things 
and our ideas* "Hence", he concludes,
it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary 
for the producing our Ideast since it is granted that they are 
produced sometimes £as in dreams, phrensies, and the like], and 
might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in
at present, without their c o n c u r r e n c e . 1 * '
Further, observing that body cannot act upon spirit, or im­
print an idea in the mind, he remarks that if it were possible for 
bodies to exist without the mind,
yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion) 
since It is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has 
created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve 
to no manner of purpose.1-®
Not only is there thus no reason for affirming the existence 
of matter, but those who have done so, have found themselves embroiled 
in numberless errors and difficulties, "not to mention impieties”, 
which have been the bane of philosophy and religion. In philosophy, 
the supposition of a material world, of vhioh we can know only
1 ^Principles. 18. 155Ibld.
156Ibld.. 19.
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appearances supposedly supported by a material substance of which
157ve can knov nothing, has been the mother of scepticism. ' In 
religion, the supposed eternity of a physical universe not visibly
dependent on God has been the corner-stone of "every wretched seot
158of atheists".
Proa the foregoing, it might be objected that Berkeley’s 
Immaterialism, or his doctrine that substance is spiritual, rests 
on a negation; and that the only evidence fo£ it, is the evidence 
agalnat matter* It must be remembered, however, that the iasaterlalism 
elaborated in the first three sections of this chapter has been a 
doctrine of affirmation, not negation, and at each step in its 
development, spirit has been accepted, and matter rejected, because 
only in this way could the mind attain the intelligibility which it 
seeks in philosophising*
If it were necessary to summarise the main steps in Berkeley’s 
establishment of his doctrine of substance, or his immaterialism, it 
might be possible to reduce them to threei the first would concern 
(in Berkeley’s terminology***) the a priori proofs, which appear in 
the first three principles of his philosophy, according to our 
division, in which the existence of spiritual substance alone is 
affirmed explicitly, and the existence of the world of material 
substances is denied implicitly* the second step (which might be 
regarded as the negative counterpart of the first) would include the
*5Tfi£. Principles. 86-88. 158Ibld.* 92.
ibid.. 21.
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refutation of tha arguments in favour of material substanoe, and 
the objections against his own doctrine. Finally, as the third 
step, there are the aposteriori proofs. These are the beneficial 
consequences vhioh Berkeley says oan legitemately be expected to 
follow from the acceptance of his immaterialism, and vhioh he 
claims will permit all things —  man, the perceivable universe, and 
God —  to be known with as perfect a knowledge as stay be had in this 
life. This final step, Berkeley makes much of, adducing it as a 
sort of eeunterproof or pragmatic test of the validity of his 
.y.t»,160
Accept reality as it is given, and do not frustrate reason
180
*By visit ve have premised, it is plain that very numerous 
and important errors have taken their rise from those false principles, 
which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise. And the 
opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most 
fruitful principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly 
advantageous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly, 
BftfrfeSI the absolute existence,of corporeal objects, hath been shewn 
to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all know* 
ledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength 
and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of 
unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a sub* 
sistenee of their cam out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is ex* 
plained in Baturaj but on the contrary a great many Inexplicable difficul­
ties arises if the supposition of matter is barely precarious, as not 
being grounded on so much as one single reasons if its consequences can­
not endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but skreen them­
selves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites kt/ss lncoanre- 
hsUfi&Ls* if withal the removal of this matter be not attended with the 
least evil aonsequeneej if it be not even missed la the world, but 
every thing as well, nay much elsler conceived without its if lastly, 
both Boeutics and iatheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only 
spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable 
both to reason and religions methinks we may expect it should be 
admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an 
hypothesis. and toe existence of matter had been allowed possible, 
which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not," 
Principles. 133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
by trying to account for tha real in terns of tha imaginary, or tha known 
in tama of tha urtmowable. Lat aubatanea therefore ba apiritualt and it 
becomes comprehensible how qualities perceivable by aanaa oan ba '’sup­
ported" (they am perceived), how wo cose by our pareaptiona (they ara 
presented to tha finite spirit through tha omnipotent agency of tha in­
finite spirit), how we can know tha real world (there exists no other 
universe save the one which we perceive), how we can know ourselves and 
prove tha existence of God (tha existence of pareaptiona demands tha 
being of a perceiver and of a causa). In this way alone oan justice 
be done to reality.
Ve can now summarise the findings of this chapter!
1* Wo know ideas, which am sensual and particular, and earn to 
us originally against our will from without But since an idea (that 
is, something which oan ba perceived) oan only ba like another idea (that 
is, something Which oan also, and in tha saaa way, ba perceived), it can­
not represent to us directly anything beyond itself, or outside tha mind. 
Therefore, if we are to avoid scepticism, we must abolish the traditional 
distinction bewteen real and wonts! existence, and say that the perceived 
(or "ideal")world is the real world. We really have no reason not to do sot 
for the distinction has its origin in tha "naive" common sense of tha classical 
realist teaching (which modem philosophers believe to ba false) that we 
know salf-subsistent things. Thus, Berkeley seeks to accept tha epiete- 
mologlval challenge of Descartes and Locke, and reunite an estranged 
philosophy and common sense. If tha real world is "ideal", than it is
^ 1
Once these ideas, or data of sense, am stored in the imagination 
and memory, we am of course free to remember about, and compound and divide 
them.
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totally intelligible, alas* there la nothing "in" it but what ia per­
ceived to be tiiere| for this reason, too, it ia demonstrably incapable 
of any activity, since we perceive in it net action* but things moved.
2. These considerations imply the followings Because there 
are objects of perception, there must be a subject to perceive themt 
this* together with inner consciousness and memory, reveals to me 
the existence of ay mind, spirit, soul or self* Because that subject 
is conscious of not being the cause of those objects, and since they, 
being inactive, cannot be the cause of each other, some such cause must 
exist. The character of these objects indicates that the cause is 
possessed of Intelligence and will, and is thus a spirit or a person) 
but Bis power is not limited as is that of finite spirits, These objects 
compose the "physical* cosmos, and they are regularly rendered present 
to, or withdrawn from, our minds according to the Laws of Nature, the 
harmonious working of which argues the wisdom and goodness of their 
Author. Thus Berkeley finds what he considers to be a cogent proof 
of the existence of God, Bow these beings, the infinite spiritual 
cause and the finite percipient spirit, are not known directly by 
sense, but inferentially by reason, which concludes to the rational 
necessity of their existence from the presenoe of the "ideal” objects 
of perception. Spirits, even so; are known immediately, just as are the 
ideas of sense t when we know, or have a notion of "God" or "inifinite 
cause", and "myself" or "finite perceiving spirit* (that is, when we 
understand the words which signify those beings), there is nothing 
which comes between the mind and Its object. In the sane way we
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know by reason tin existence of a third class of beings, other minds,
or spirits like myself} whom ve recognise by the offsets God permits
162
ns to see produced, and by analogy with our own minds. These 
spiritual, active, self-subsiatent beings compose the whole of 
extramental reality) and as "intra-mental", perceivable, or "ideal” 
reality is totally passive and intelligible, so extramental, per­
cipient, or substantial reality is active and intelligent. This 
brings us to the arguments against matter *
3, Hatter is intimately connected with the supposed extra­
mental, "real”, or substantial existence of things) but as ve know 
ideas, it is entirely gratuitous to affirm any such extramental 
existencet since, if a substantial (but non-spiritual) reality were 
to exist "behind" our ideas, ve could never possibly come to know it. 
Its nature being entirely inconceivable, a madman would be as likely 
to guess its true constitution as a philosopher. Ve have therefore
no reason to entertain any opinion on the question, about which nothing
163
really can be proved. The existence of sensible things does not
*Ve know God by analogy with our own minds, too, for Berkeley*
"For all the notion 1 have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own 
soul heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections,” Third Pialogus. 
Works. II, 231-232. In Alclohron. IT, 20-21, to discusses the Scholastic 
teaching on the flMigg2L2gjeg^$o»MgB» vhioh is implied in the words of 
Fhilonous just quoted, and which is explicitly accepted in the latter work. 
£f. Works. Ill, 168-170.
163Like the eternity of the world for mediaeval scholastic thinkers, 
the existence of an extramental, but unknowable, world would appear to be, 
for Berkeley, a aubjeot on vhioh reason cannot properly speak) since, as 
he points out, "if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should 
ever come to know it) and if there were not, we might have the very same 
reasons to think there were that ve have now." (Principles. 20). If any 
positive conclusion were to be drawn, therefore, another authority would 
have to be consultedt the schoolmen could point to Faith (the fact of a
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even imply material or substantial existence; for when we say that 
seaslble things *exist", we seas only that collections of various 
habitually-related perceptions exist in our ooaseiousness, so that 
for these "perceivable1substances'*, to be is to be perceived. This 
is the only sense in vhioh either "substanoe" or "existence" oan be 
predicated of "things" ia the world of sense. For perceptions to 
exist in an unperoeiviag subject (such as matter) is itself a 
contradiction! and so the world that ve know cannot exist apart from 
a mind. A oontrary opinion could only be formed by a process akin 
to the invalid kind of abstraction which Berkeley says has dis­
figured epistemology with an absurd theory of universals, and which 
has permitted philosophers to talk as if the prime matter of the 
Aristotelians (vhioh is potentially all things, but actually no­
thing16*) oduld be ooneeived as existing separately. Matter is 
spoken of as having only two positive attributes proper to itself, 
and both of these —  the bare fact of existence, but not anything, 
and the notion of supporting sensible qualities, but in a completely
temporal creation having been revealed) as having decided in favour 
of one of the two answers whleh reason can give) but in this ease, as 
Berkeley shows in section 32 of the Principles, and oontrary to the 
teaching of Malebranohe, Revelation has said nothing.
“ to. 517. Aristotle saysi "By matter I mean that vhioh,
not being a ’this* actually, is potentially a ’this*". Metaphysics. VIII, 1, 
1042a27-28. Basle Works. 312. Again, "By matter I mean that Vhioh in it­
self is neither a particular thing nor®a certain quantity nor assigned to 
any other of the categories by which being is determined." Ibid.. VII, 3, 
1029al9-22. IMd., , 735. Cf. "All thingB produced either by nature or by
art have matter) for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, 
and this capacity is the matter in each". Ibid.. 7, !D32a20-22. Ibid.. 791*
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equivocal sense —  are for Berkeley "manifest repugnancies" or 
"abstract!one". We can only conclude that natter ia not only un­
knowable , but impossible, Hence, from the existence of the objects 
of pereeption9 it is impossible to reason to the existence of matter. 
This is the reason why Berkeley, starting in each ease with the same 
premisses, rejects material substance, and yet accepts a universe 
of spirits,*^
U. Were further proof required, there is this to consider i 
Matter perform no function whatever. How it can produce ideas, no 
philosopher can say. There are no sensible qualities for it to sup­
port, for primary qualities are inseparably united (in our perception 
of them) with the secondary, and are thus just as "subjective" or 
"mental". Again, there is no reason for us to think otherwises far 
if we know ideas, it is not for us to say whieh represent reality,
and which do not, and which qualities therefore are in things, and
which in us. Finally, belief in matter has led to scepticism (because 
it makes reality unknowable) and to atheism (because it seem to make 
God unnecessary in accounting for the existence of the world). In 
short,
Hatter being once expelled out of Kature, drags with it so many
165The principle involved here enabled Berkeley to free him­
self ftrom the early indecision which this entry (637) in the Com­
mentaries manifestst "Say you there must be a thinking substance. 
Something unknown weh perceives & supports & ties together the Ideas. 
Say 1, make it appear there is any need of it & you shall have it for
I care not to take away any thing I can see the least reason to
think should exist." (Italics mine). This last sentanee seem to 
hold the key to all Berkeley’s philosophising, especially as it con­
cerns substance.
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sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of 
disputes end puxsling questions, vhioh have been thorns in 
the sides of divines, as veil as philosophers, and made so 
much fruitless vork for mankind! that if the arguments ve 
have produced against it, are not found equal to demonstration 
(as to me they evidently seem) yet 1 am sure all friends to 
knowledge, pesos, and religion, have reason to vishs they 
vere.*®®
The fruit of Berkeley*s speculations seems to be thist 
that a true and rational explanation of reality must be based on 
a true and intelligible notion of substanoe.
^Principles. 96.
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SOME NEGATIVE IHFLUEHCES
The Importance which Berkeley attaches to the so-called 
a posteriori proofs of his system1 seems to Indicate that he 
found as much satisfaction in the beneficial consequences which 
were to flow from his immaterialism, as In the doctrine itself, 
for him, indeed, it was a Mans to an endi the destruction of 
scepticism and atheism) and towards the attainment of this goal, 
existing philosophies could give no direct help. He begins the 
•Preface" to his Dialogues between gyles and Phllonous with this 
commentt
Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than 
the design of Mature and Providence, that the end of speculation 
be practice, or the Improvement and regulation of our lives and 
actions; yet those, who are most addicted to speculative studies, 
seen as generally of another mind. And, indeed, if we consider 
the pains that have been taken, to perplex the plainest things, 
that distrust of the senses, these doubts and scruples, these 
abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance 
of the sciences, it will not seem strange, that men of leisure 
and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions,,,, 
Upon the common principles of philosophers, ve are not assured 
of the existence of things from their being perceived. And ve 
are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls 
under our senses. Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes.2
Mo less than with Descartes, the overthrow of scepticism in philo­
sophy became with Berkeley a personal preoccupation which, in any
*Vidc supra. . 81, and note 160, 
^orks. II, 167,
88
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explanation of hie reaction to the philosophy and science of his 
day, nust ba rsgardsd as a determining factor* It will contri­
bute, therefore, to an appreciation of the value of Berkeley’s 
Immaterialism, to review briefly Eoae of the then-current theories 
in the physical and metaphysical disciplines, and to see how they 
influenced him in the formation of his doctrine, and led him, 
even though by way of reaction and denial, to its final conclu­
sions.3
Perhaps because they were so important for his contemporaries, 
and so insignificant for him, ve should speak first of the findings 
of the Mechanists! in particular, of Sir Isaac Newton and his followers*
1. The World of the Newtonians 
Matter with mathematically measurable properties, capable 
of motion in space and through times this was the hypothetical 
basis on which Newton built his physios; but as Mary Shaw Kuypers
Normally, the influences which shape a man's thought are 
considered before the thought itself; but in this case, since a 
clear exposition of Berkeley's doctrine of substance seemed to re­
quire the etatement only of the two great positive influences upon 
him: that ve know ideas (an opinion which he shared with Descartes and 
looks), and that the tntaiUHhia "substance" of perceivable things 
is no more than the sum of their qualities (which to found expounded 
in Locke's philosophy)i those influences have been considered directly 
in connexion with those of Berkeley’s own doctrines in which they 
are manifested* The influences we shall be concerned with in Chapter
III, therefore, will be chiefly negative! the vast, mechanical ana
entirely "inhuman* universe of the Newtonians, which to him represented 
an expression of all that was most pernicious in modern thought; the 
body-mind problem which Descartes's attempts to refound the certitude 
of philosophy had produced, and which Berkeley attempted to solve; 
and finally, the partial answers to the body-mlnd problem which to 
found in tie partial Immaterialism of Nicholas Malebraneto, and the 
empiricism of John Looks* Berkeley learned mush from Descartes, Mhle- 
branche and Locke; but to was not afraid to differ from them in their 
main conclusions, and for this reason their systems become more meaning­
ful in the light of his criticisms of them.
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hat pointed out, natter, space, and tine, were popularly regarded as
more than mare hypotheses1
Hwton in tee Principle operated with these concepts as 
methodological postulates, without considering their meta­
physical status* •••
Nevertheless,
Newtonian science*••was Interpreted as a system of metaphysics, an 
exhaustive description of reality. Methodological concepts appeared 
in popular thought as independently existing realities.^
This interpretation was shared with "the non-teehnlcal public" 
by "some of Newton's followers", and was apparently given at least ver­
bal countenance by Sir Isaac himself*'* But whether it originated in 
Newton himself, or only in those tee misread him, tee authority of 
Newton did much to establish among philosophers, no less than among the 
commonality of men, a view of reality which, as Professor E. A. Burtt 
has stated,
saw in man a puny, irrelevant spectator (so far as a being wholly 
Imprisoned in a dark room can be called such°) of the vast mathe­
matical system whose regular motions according to mechanical prin­
ciples constituted the world of nature.... The world that people 
had thought themselves living ia —  a world rich with colour and 
sound,.. .speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and creative ideals —  
was crowded now into minute corners in tee brains of scattered or­
ganic beings* The really Inportant world outside was a world hard, 
cold, colourless, silent and dead) a world of quantity, a world of 
mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity. The 
world of qualities as immediately perceived by man became Just a 
curious and quite minor effect of that Infinite machine beyond.'
The implications of a mechanical universe did not disturb
^Studies in tee Eighteenth Century Background of Hume's Em­
piricism {Minneapolis* tJniveraiby of Mijinesota Press, 19^ 0), 1£, i’7*
$Ibid., 19.
6
A figure strikingly reminiscent of Locke’a famous description 
of the "understanding", in his Essay, II, xi, 17*
^Tho Metaphysical foundations of Modern Physical Science, 236-237*
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many of Berkeley's contemporaries) Dr* Cudvorth, for example ,
could write that sensory qualities were
a most wise contrivance thus to beautify and adorn the visible 
and material world, to add luster or embellishment to it, that 
it might have charms and relishes and allurements in it, to 
gratify our appetites) whereas otherwise really in itself, the 
whole corporeal world in its naked hue is nothing else but a 
heap of dust, or atoms, of several figures and magnitudes 
variously agitated up and down.°
How Berkeley had great admiration for the experimental 
method,^ and for Hewton as an experimental philosopher)10 but 
the great difficulty with tbs Newtonian vision du mondo was, as 
Berkeley realised, that it (at least in its popular formulation} 
pretended to explain the perceived, which existed only in the 
mind, in terms of the "real", which existed only in the imagination 
(if it could rightly be said to exist even there11) j and to him
SBalph Cudvorth, A Treatise oonoqrnlng Signal aa|
Morality. . 295*296) quoted in Kuypers, op. olt.. U.
9Be writes to Johnsons "The true use and end of Natural Philo­
sophy is to explain the phenomena of nature) which is done by discovering 
the lavs of nature, and reducing particular appearances to them. This is 
Sir Isaac Newton's method) and such method or design is not in the least 
inconsistent with the principles I lay down...." Works. II, 279. An even 
better indication of his attitude towards the experimental method is his 
constant appeal, in the Principles and Dialogues, to the test of personal 
experience.
10S£* A Bofonofr of Fraa-thinking in Mathematics. 13* "I freely own 
that Sir Isaac Newton hath shewed himself an extraordinary mathematician, 
a profound naturalist, a person of the greatest abilities and erudition." 
Works. XV, 114.
37. It is remarkable how closely Berkeley's 
criticisms of Newtonian physios parallel those of that modern "philo­
sophising scientist”, Sir James Jeans, and how much of what Berkeley 
regarded as the true nature and function of science is reproduced in the 
letter's description of it. Restating the thought of Principles. 66, 
Berkeley mites in Slide* "The mechanical philosopher...inquires pro­
perly concerning the rules and modes of operation alone, and not con­
cerning the cause) forasmuch as nothing mechanical is or really can be
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it was both«i*pioua and unintelligible".12 Imagine natter stripped 
of Its sensory qualities, and there la nothing loft to imagine) an* 
dov it with purely mathematical properties, and you ara daallng with 
meaningless abstractions. This, aa we have seen, vaa the burden of 
hia argument) and had Lewis Carroll lived two eanturiaa earlier, 
and Berkeley not triad ao carefully "to rein in y* Satyrieal 
nature",1^ ha might have concluded, with Sir James Jeans, that 
"it ia only in Wonderland that a eat oan be atripped of everything 
but a grin."1^  Instead, he wrote in the Seeond Dialogue between 
Hvlaa and Phllonouji an impassioned deeoription of the "glittering 
furniture" of the univerae vhieh enda in that great iss£i&£9L2£l»
a cause.,.. Though it be supposed the chief business of a natural 
philosopher to trace out causes from the effects, yet this is to be 
understood not of agents, but of principles! that is, of component 
parts, in one sense, or of lava or rules, in another. In strict truth, 
all agents are incorporeal) and as such are not properly of physical 
consideration.... Neither doth it seen, as la supposed by the greateit 
of mechanical philosophers, that the true way of proceeding in their 
science is, from known motions in nature to investigate the moving 
forces, forasmuch as force ia neither corporeal, nor belongs to any 
corporeal thing) nor yet to be discovered by experiments or mathematical 
reasonings, vhieh reach no farther than discernible effects and motions 
in things passive and moved." girls, 249, 247, ££. Be Jfeta, pas aim, 
p^ yglples, loi" 117) etc.
Leaving aside the doctrine of spiritual causality which is peculiar 
to himself, Berkeley's fundamental thesis —  that science oan be concerned 
only with "appearances”, with a aeries of ideas of sense that are arbit­
rarily connected —  seems to be echoed by Sir Janes Jeans, when he saysi 
"The study of physics has driven us to the positivist conception of physics. 
We oan never understand what events are, but must limit ourselves to des­
cribing the pattern of events in mathematical terms),,.these will never 
describe nature itself, but only our observations on nature.... Physics 
tries to discover the pattern of events vhioh controls the phenomena we 
observe. But we can never know what this pattern means or how it orig­
inates..,," Physics and Philosophy (New lorki Mwmillan, 1943), 15-16)
Si, 190, 195-204, It is of course the fact that Berkeley enunciated 
what is essentially "the positivist conception of physios* that makes the 
parallel historically interesting,
^oodbridge, op. clt.. 20U. ^Phil. Comm., 634.
142EaJ2i£.» 93’
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What treatment than ia thoee philodophera iesetve, «Jo wouM 
deprive these noble and delightful scenes of aUrealityTlow 
should thoaa principles be entertained, that lead m  to think XJ 
all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare?
That abstraction should entail an impoverishment of the reality open
which it i» made, baa always bean recognised aa tba prise whioh the
finite Intellect mat pay* ia order to peaeirate to the essential
constitution of things, lot that a speed#* ©f "mathematical* or
"scientific* abstraction should b# peraitted to destroy all that
it seeks to explain* and to set up in it* place an «#aseatial
reality* vhieh Is sot ©sly unknowable, but unreal, i* to !*»#•
trate to nothing, while obseurlng everything.
But Newton and bis follower# were not the only seventeenth 
century aeehaalsi#* another one of their maker *»* ieaeartea.
' fhia ia how ieaeartea define* swtoataneet
Par substance m m  m  powrens entendre riaa ifautre qua la chose 
cui exist#, do telle aorta ftt»#ll# n«ait besein de rien d*a«tre 
axister.... la substance qul a*a absoluaeat beaoin de riea 
exister ne peat $tre entendue quo combo unique.-1®
Thus, strictly speaking, there can be eoaeeived but one sub-
stance: §od. However, is a wider (an aialogieal) aanae, "aubatanoe*
also applies 'to finite thing*. Thus he say* that there are alao
created substances, realities which depend directly upon God and
which are known to u# aa the immediate subjects of those attribute#
17
of which we can have real idea*. these substances ©aa only be
of two aorta, corporeal and thinking.18 to understand the impor­
tance of Descartes1 a statements, we aaai consider the* at greater
15tforks. I I ,  211. ' I6Princlpes ds la ..Ib U aa a ih iis 1# 5U
Oeuvres. IX, 47.
17
Reponses aux dauxjemes objectione. Definition 5.
^Prlnclpes. I. 52. fflL.
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X«ngtb.
Xt ic the cogito. first sad foremost, vhloh reveals to Des­
cartes the existence of a substance i for it is with his own being that
he begins, deducing froa its reality his whole philosophy of God and
19Mature} and he ealls hinself a thing. "une ehose qui pense", He 
oan know with certainty the nature of substanoe, however, only by 
means of his doctrine of "clear and distinct ideas", "Heus ne
connaissons par la substance imaediatenent par elle-aeme, nais seule-
20sent paroe qu'elle est Is sujet de quslqoes aetes...." One of
these aots, the cogito discoverst consciousness or thinking. When
he attempts to form a dear and distinct idea of the subject of the
cogito. he finds that the very act of thinking (or doubting, or
sensing, or willing) is the only thing which oan be attributed to
his nature without the danger of error. Hence he concludes!
Mils encore quo tout attribut soit suffisant pour faire eonnaltre 
la substance, il y on a toutefols un en chaoune qui eonstitue sa 
nature ou sou essence, et de qui tous les autres dependent....
La pensde eonstitue la nature de la substance qui pease. Car,,, 
toutes les proprldtes qua nous trouvons en la chose qui pease ne 
sent qua des fafoes diffdrentea de penaer.22
The nature of title soul, or thinking substanoe, is thus thought itself}
23and the subject of the cogito is for Descartes a wholly spiritual being.
In the universe of bodies, the same principles operate! here, 
a mechanical physic* using only the rigorous demonstrations of mathe­
matics supplies Descartes with his knowledge of the physical cosmos.
19 / gspssfi* vn, 28. In the Pi so ours, he writes!
"je eonaus,,,que J’etais use substance•* Dlaoours. 17, ed, Gilson, 33. .
20
Rtponati aux trolsifcw objection# a QsmSi$ 136*
Meditation, loo, olt. ^Prlnclpes, I, 93} Oeuvres. IX, 48.
23 ✓ >
££« Beponses aux deuxlomca objections. Definition 6. Mot even the
name given the thinking substanoe is to suggest anything of the corporeal.
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The only clear and diatlnet Idea ve oan have of body la that it is
extended) extension explains figure and notion, and notion explains
all the phenomena of Baturei
C’est pourquoi il n'exists dans tout 1*universe qu'una seule 
et none matlfcre, et elle n'est oonnue qua par son 6tendue. £t 
toutes les proprietes qua nous percevons elairenent en elle se 
reduisent a oeoi qu’elle est divisible et mobile en see parties...• 
Touts modification on la diversity de toutes ses formes depend 
du nouvwneat.2^
Hence,
1'Itendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur eonstitue la 
nature de la substanoe eorporelle).•.tout ee que d'ailleurs 
on pent attribuer au corps presuppose de l'etendue et n'est 
qu’une dependence de oe qui est etendu.5
Bov, betveen a substanoe and its principal attribute —  its
essence or nature, in terms of vhieh all its other attributes oan
be explained —  Descartes makes only a logical distinction,
for according to his theory, a real distinction oan exist only
betveen two or more beings vhieh oan be conceived clearly and
distinctly as existing, one without the otherj obviously, this
27applies only to substances. The various modes in vhieh the 
principal attribute may realise itself are called distinct
from the substance in which they inhere, however, since substanoe 
can be clearly and distinctly conceived without one of its modes 
(the soul need not always remember, for example), but ve cannot
^inolEes, II, 23) Oeuvres, IX, 75.
25M § * »  I, 53) Oeuvres. IX, 48.
26Ibld.. 62.
^Ibld.. 60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conceive a mode at all, unless It be as the mode of a substance.2®
Prom this he concludest
32 est asm plus alsd de conns!tre une substance qui pense ou 
une substance dtendua que la substance toute seule, laissant h 
part si elle pense ou si elle est etendue, pares qu’il y a quel* 
que difficult^ a separer la notion que nous avons de la sub­
stance de cells que nous areas de la pensde et de l’etendue) 
car ellss its different de la substance que par cela seul que 
nous canalderons quelquefois la pensee et l’etendue sans fairs 
reflexion sur la chose memo qui pense ou qui est etendue.2?
From this brief outline of Descartes’s doctrines, it is 
possible to see a certain similarity between his approach to the 
notion of substance, and that which Berkeley was later to taka •
It has already been remarked of Berkeley, that ha was more interested 
in determining the "knowability’ of substance, than in setting forth 
its nature. In a certain sense, the same can be said of Descartes. 
The rationalist’s treatment of tha question is far fuller than 
Berkeley’s) even so, when Descartes discusses the nature of the 
soul and the nature of tha body, he is above all trying to discover 
vhab he can say about sod and body that will give him an absolutely 
certain knowledge of their existence. His clear and distinct ideas 
of tha sod as thinking and of the body as extended enable him to 
affirm that these beings exist with at least as much perfection as 
his thoughts of them contain.-** His theory of distinctions and his 
notion of the principal attribute as nature or essence, enable him,
^Prlnclpea, I, 61.
^Ibld.. 63) Oeuvres, IX, $3.
*°Cf. ibid., 60.
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in knowing thmt attribute * or any manifestation of it, to affini that 
ho knows the thingi for 1m  knows that which makes the thing to bo 
what it is. Thus he provides himself with the moans of escaping 
from the prison of his own mind) but at the same time, 1m  lays down 
the foundation of the bodymlnd problem which has dominated philo­
sophy to so great on extent sinee his time* Chi one hand* there is 
mind or spiritual substanoe* the nature of which is to be thinking) 
on the other* there is body or material substanoe* the nature of which 
is to be extended. By definition they are opposed and mutually ex­
clusive) so mush so that* according to his own theory of distinctions*
the prime example of a real distinction is that which seems to exist
31between a man’s soul and his body. That the human person should
be one substance composed of the two* or that they should even act
32upon each other in any way at all* is thus inconceivable* even 
though it is an incontestable fact of experience,^ This* then* 
is the origin of the body-aind problem, to which Berkeley's denial 
of material subataneJ^ay be looked upon as a solution.
Berkeley found his problem in the philosophy of Descartes) 
but he also found there various ideas which he used to work out his 
solution. Be agrees that the mind knows ideas* but he does not use
SssbBlS&i vii, 81.
32
As Descartes himself admits when he speaks of "l'obscurite" en 
la notion que nous avons de leur union1** and adds that it does not 
seem possible to him "que 1*esprit humaln soit capable de ooneevolr 
blen distinctement, et en mSme temps* la distinction d'entre l'aime 
et le corps et lour union," "Lettre a Kliaabeth"* 28 juin 1643)
Oeuvres. Ill, 693.
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the term ia as broad a sense as Descartes (restricting it to signify 
objects of sense only), and does not make ideas innate. He uses the 
rationalist's technique of reasoning from thought to extramental 
reality, howeverj and, in his denial of matter, argues that the 
mind, being spiritual, can only know that which possesses the saw 
degree of immateriality as itself. If, therefore, matter and spirit 
are regarded as being by definition mutually exclusive, not only is 
any interaction between them inconceivable, but matter, if it were 
allowed to exist Independently, could not possibly have any in­
telligible or immaterial attributesi hence it simply could not, as such, 
be khovn —  no more inferred by reason than perceived by sense. If 
matter cannot be known, therefore, it cannot exist) at least, we 
oust carry on our metaphysical speculations as though it did not.
In his affirmation of spirit, Berkeley also makes use of 
Cartesian principles. Descartes, ho finds, "owns we knew not a 
substanoe Immediately by itself but by this alone that it is the 
subject of several aeta.»~ But, rationally conceived, the soul 
can have no faculties) or rather, it cannot be (or exist) distinct 
from them. In section 27 of the Principles he writes«
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active beingi as it perceives 
ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or other­
wise operates about them, it is called the will.
Again, in the earlier gfaUogOpfetol f f » we read*
I must not say the Will & understanding are all one but that they 
are both Abstract Ideas i.e. none at all. They not being even 
rations different from the Spirit, Qua faculties, or active.”
3*phll. Comm.. 795. Vide supra. 9U.
35Ibld.. 871.
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I oust not section the Understanding as a faculty or part of the 
Mind, I must include Understanding & Will etc. in the word 
Spirit by vhieh 1 mean all that is active,36
Thus, in hie "proof for the soul", when Berkeley concludes to
the necessity of Etoder standing and Will (froa the presence of the
willed and the understood), after the manner of Descartes he is
really proving the existence of the mind, or the spiritual self.
At this point, however, Berkeley departs soaevhat froa the
Cartesian position. "A soul or spirit is aa active being, whose
existence consists not ia being perceived, but in perceiving ideas
and thinking. Hence he agrees with Descartes that "it is a plain
38
consequence that the soul always thinks"• But thinking laplies 
a thoughtj and for Berkeley, the Bind is not the source of its own 
ideasi
1 must not say that the Understanding differs not froa.the par­
ticular Ideas, or the Will froa particular Volition*.
Tis most sure and certain that our Ideas are distinct froa the 
Mind i.e. the Will, the Spirit.4®
Nevertheless,
Some Ideas or other I must have so long as I exist or Will. But 
no one Idea or sort of Ideas is essential.^!
Where the ideas coae froa originally, ve have already scant their
existence enables Berkeley to argue to the existence of God. Here,
too, he aay be said to add a further qualification which serves (as
it were) to establish the autonomy of his thought. Replying to the
fophll. Coaa., 848.
^Ibld.. 98.
40
Ibid.. 847.
^Phil. Coma., 848
%bld.. 842.
^Principles. 137.
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fifth objection against his imaaterialism, Berkeley says that the 
qualities ve perceive "are in the mind only as they are perceived 
by it, that is, not by vay of mode or attribute, but only by way 
of Idea."** Specifically, the objection states "that if extension 
and figure exist only in the mind, it follovs that the mind is 
extended and figured} since extension is a mode or attribute, vhieh 
(to speak vith the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which 
it exists.* The significance of Berkeley's answer is far wider, 
however, far because of it, ve must say (as Professor Jessop does in 
his "Introduction* to the Principles) that the ideas of sense, or 
■corporeal phenomena...are not modes of any substanoe, but are 
wholly objects to a subject} and that subject is God essentially, 
and each of us accidentally,*^
Thus, starting from Cartesian principles, Berkeley has 
forced his own (and quite different) passage out of the prison of 
the mlndt the objects of knowledge are indeed ideas, but they are 
also real things, present to the mind, but not subjective modifications 
of It, Only the quite private and personal ideas of imagination and 
memory oan now be called "subjective*. Perhaps it is here that the 
basis of "Berkeley's realism* lies.
3. mcholaa Mtlebranche 
Descartes, both by his notion of intelligibility, and by 
his theory of distinctions, made the substantial union and mutual
^Principles. 49. A3Works. II, 12.
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interaction of thinking soul and extended body impossible to under­
stand, oven though bo accepted it as an undoubted truth of experience. 
Malebranche strove to safeguard all three —  the clear and distinot 
ideas, the radical "separability* implied in a real distinction, and 
the value of experience —  and proposed a solution of the Cartesian 
problem by interpreting tha last in terms of the first two. This 
solution is stated at the beginning of the seventh of his Conver­
sations on Metaphysics and Raligiont
(■ •W N M M IIN N M M M H M M M M M M H a M H a M IM M IM W a M ie M a M M n M e
Je vous soutiens que nous ne sommas nulleaent unis a notre corps, 
bien loin de l'etre a ltd plus etroltemedb qu'a touts autre chose.... 
Nan, Arista, a parlor axactenant et en rigeeur, votre esprit 
n’est et ne peut etre uni a vptre corpsj car il ne pout etre uni 
qu'a ce qui pent agir en lul.^
Man is therefore composed of two entirely separate and independent
substances, and if they are "united", the only rational explanation
of their "union" must be, that God has established certain general
laws, according to which the accidental modification of one is the
occasion (and no more) of a corresponding modification in the other.^
is echoes Descartes's definition of substance, and drawing out its ira-
^Entoetl«as aur la Metaphyaique et aur la Religion, VII, i.
^This principle, Descartes himself had already outlined. Vide 
supra, 30, note U7. Of. "Memo les ideas des mouvements et dee figures sent 
naturellenent en nous) et a plus forte raison, les idses de douleur, des 
couleurs...nous doivent etre naturelles, afln que notre esprit, a 1'oc­
casion de certains mouvemsnts corporals, avee lesquels elles n’ont aueune 
ressemblance, se les puisse rsprdsentar." "Lsttre a M...", Oeuvres, VIII, 
353. Of* "Lsttre a Mersenna", 22 juillet l61*lj Oeuvres, HI', Uldt Motes 
in programme quoddaa, ibid., VIII, pt. 2, 358-35^. How literal an inter­
pretation MaietrancEe puis upon the term "occasion" may be seen in De la 
Recherche da la Verite, VI, 11, 3, where he says that when a man wills
to move his arm, that willing is only ths occasional, and not the true,
cause of ths motion in arm. For Berkeley’s eoaraent, vide infra, 108.
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plications, expresses himself thus*
Toutes les creatures ne sent unles qu’a Dleu d'une union 
lmrf&late. SUes ne dependent essentiellement et dlrectsaent 
que de Ini. Comae elles nont toutes egalement impuissantes, 
elles ne dependent point nutuellemant les unes des autres. /
On pent dire qu’elles emit unles entre elles et qu’elles de­
pendent nine les unes des autres,,.pourvu qu'on deneure d’aeeord 
que ee n’est qu’en consequence des volontes inaraables et tou­
jour s efficaoes du Createur.,.. II a voulu que J’eusse certains 
sentiments, certains emotions, quand 11 y aurait dans son cer- 
veau oertaines traces, certains ebranlements d'esprlts) 11 a 
voulu, en un act, et 11 rent sans cesse que les modalitls de 
I1esprit et du corps fussent reciproquee. Toil! 1’union et 
la dependence naturelle des ,deux parties dont nous sosews 
composes* oe n’est que la reciprocation sutuelle de nos 
nodalites appuyee sur le fondament inebranlable des decrets 
divins.46
This accounts for the apparent connexion between the
world of spirits and the world of bodies* the God Who is at once
17
the source of all being and of all activity in Nature, is also 
the cause of knowledge in us. But He is more than that, says 
Father Malebranohe1 the Divine Substance is the very content of 
our knowledge.
God knows (or has ideas of) all created beings (else He 
could not have created them), and He knows them in knowing the in­
finite iadtability of His perfections) He knows all true relations)
40
He is truth Itself. How, by means of perceptions which, though
possibly slnilsr, are totally peculiar to each one of us, we all see
immutable, necessary, and eternal truths. These, as such, require
49an eternal, necessary and immutable being in which to exist. 
Furthermore, as God is immense (though not locally extended) and
^Bntretiens. VII, xiii. ^As Descartes had taught 1 $£.
Prlncipoa. I, 28.
4® /q
Entretlens. VIII, xl. 49Ibid.. sect. xii.
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50contains tha world aa eternity oontaina time, so by His
presence Ha is intimately united to our souls. Hence, Male-
bransha concludes t
Cast an Man saula qua nous voyons la verite, C'eet en lui 
seula qua sa trouve la lund&re qui l1 eclairs, lui at toutas las 
intelligences. 21 est saga par sa propme sagesse, at nous ne 
la pouvons Btre qua par l'union que nous avons avee lui. Ha 
disputons point da oas prineipas. 21s sont evidenta, ea ma 
sambla, at la fondement da la certitude qua nous trouvons dans 
las soiansas.51
Mslebranehe demonstrates tha truth of this assertion in
another way, arguing that by tha senses ve do not apprehend bodies
existing outside of us. *$r soul is not extended) it doss not
fill tha space betveen as and tha fixed stars, nor does it
etreteh out to the houses at the horiiont *11 est done necessaire
qua notre ins vole las nelsons at les etoiles ou alias ne sont
pas* —  that is, within itself.**
Indeed, when ve perceive bodies, ve have only an idea of
determinate extension) but extension in Itself carries with it no
notion of limitation, and so must be an infinite idea vhieh oan
exist, like tha necessary and eternal truths, only in an infinite
mind. What ve pereelve, therefore, is Intelligible extension.
53and that ve see in the mind of God.
But if this is so —  and the impossibility of perceiving 
what cannot act upon tha soul evidently confirms it —  then we 
cannot know by natural means whether bodies exist. All the
50m a . .  <*>». i». w t .  * u .
52 /
Be la Rcoherohc de la Verite. 2, xiv, 1. We think that they
are without us when wa perceive them only because ”11 n'est en la puis­
sance de I'arae de les voir quand 11 lui plait....” 2bld.
*%£• Hntretlens. 22, i-vi.
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beauties of the oreation wo perceive ore intelligible, proportioned
to our minds, end in no way related to extended matter. God might
54even destroy the material world and we should never know It.
But that suoh a world does exist, we are certain! Reason oannot
prove it to us, but Faith can. In foot, it furnishes us with
une demonstration a laquelle il est impossible de resistor....
La Foi m'apprend que Dieu a eree le del et la terre; elle 
m'apprend que l'leriture est m  livre divin. St oe livre, ou 
sen apparense, me dit nettement et positivement qu’il y a 
mills et mille creatures. Dono voila mes apparenees ehangees en 
rdalit^s, II jf ajdes corps t cel* est demontre en touts rlgueur, 
la Foi supposes, *
ffclebranche's position is certainly close to that of Berkeley, 
as is apparent even from this sketch. The vision of all things in 
God; the insistence that, as the known world is the world of intelligible 
extension, the existence of the "real", material, or extra-mental 
world oan never be known by reason unaided; the fact that we commonly 
attribute external existence to the objects of sensation because these 
come to us against our will from without; these are some of the 
teachings which contain elements common to the systems of both philo­
sophers, whose whole approach to the problem of knowledge which the 
Cartesian dualism of mind and matter bed produced is indeed very 
much the same. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that when 
Berkeley’s doctrine first became known, its author was supposed, like 
John Borris, to be a British diseiple of the Oratorlan, This sup­
position however, Berkeley denied both in his published workd, and 
in private correspondence. In the letter to his patron, Lord Feroival,
W Sf. H U . ,  i, T-*i. TI, m i .
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written after he had heard of this misinterpretation of hit thought
by Samuel Clarke, he declares*
As to what is said of ranking as with Father Halebranehe and Mr.
Morris, whose writings are thought to he too fine-spun to be of 
any great use to mankind, I hare this answer, that I think ths 
notions I embrace are not in the least agreeing with theirs, bat 
indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the mein points, inasmuch 
as 1 know few writers I take ayself at bottom to differ more froa 
than from thsm.5®
The mein conclusion of Malebranehe's system seems to be that, 
although it has no right to do so (because it violates the prinoiple, 
nihil fecit frnatra nature), natter exists} Berkeley argues that if it 
has no right to exist, then it cannot exist* This difference is of 
sufficient importance to justify Berkeley's claim to be no pro­
fessed follower of Halebranehe, to idiom, in fact, he holds himself 
opposed on three major issues t
1* Our knowledge of the "real" world* Malebranohe, as we have 
seen, holds that the existence of an external creation has been revealed 
in Holy Scripture, and that we can therefore believe by Faith in the 
being of that which we cannot know by reason* This solution, Berkeley 
rejects in toto* and declares
that no sort of writings whatsoever, sacred or profane, which use 
those and the like words [timber and stone, mountains and rivers, etc*] 
in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have any meaning in them, are 
in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine.
That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even 
corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shown 
to be agreeable to our principles* and the difference betwixt things 
and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained*
Andi do noC tliinic,”*th«t either' mat philosophers call matter, or 
the existence of objects without the mind, is any where mentioned in 
Scripture
^Quoted in Works, ed* Fraser, X, 35U-355* 
^Principles, 82*
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Twice in this passage, Berkeley refers to e "vulgar sense" 
vhieh ordinary language, even that of Scripture, employs. In section 
51 of the Principles* where he considers the objection that hia doetrllie 
will take us froa this ordinary mode of speech, and that this procedure 
is bound to be net with ridicule, Berkeley enunciates his famous dieturn 
that, in applying philosophical conclusions to life, "ve ought to think 
with the learned, and speak with thoyuliar." In defence of this prin­
ciple, he appeals to a parallel ease in which those vho "are convinced 
of the truth of the Copemloan system, do nevertheless say the sun rises, 
the sun sets, or oomes^ to the meridian"j^ adding further that "a little 
reflexion*••will make it manifest, that the common use of language would
receive ne manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of
m
our tenets," By this principle, Berkeley quite effectively destroys
the scriptural basis for the belief in the existence of an external
world, upon which Ifclebraaehc had built his realism,
2. fhe vision of all things in Godi In the Second Dialogue.
Hylas states Malebranehe's position thusi
They conceive that tie soul being immaterial, is incapable of being 
united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves, 
but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, 
which being spiritual is therefore purely intelligible, or capable 
of being the Immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides, the 
divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each 
created being) and vhieh are for that reason proper to exhibit or 
represent them to the mind,®®
Replying as Philonous, Berkeley objects that "our ideas, which are
things altogether passive and inert", can neither be part of, nor repre-
^Prlnclples. 51. "ibid.
*°tforks. II, 213.
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sent "the h h m i  or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, 
purely active being*} furthermore, thle hypothesis entails many difficul­
ties, being liable "to all the absurdities of the common hypotheses, In 
making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a spirit**
But it has this fault peculiar to itself, "that it makes that material 
world serve to no purpose** If it is valid to reject other hypotheses 
in the sciences because they make Mature act in vain, a fortiori this
argument should apply hare, where the creation of the whole universe
61is made to be ia vain.
In this rejection of M&lebranohe's doctrine, Berkeley can with 
justice deny that "ideas*, as he conceives them, could exist in the 
mind of Godi not so much because they are "passive" and He "active*, 
but because they are sensuous and particular, whereas God knows 
singular things (in the traditional view which Malebranohe accepts) 
la knowing fils essence, "the likeness of things", which is the cause or 
active principle "of all the principles vhieh enter into the composition 
of the thing" —  that is, the fora, vhieh is the source of universality, 
and matter, the source of indlviduAlity. For the discrete and par­
ticular Berkeleian "ideas" to exist in the mind of God would be in­
compatible with His "indivisibility* j and as Hslebranehe obviously 
regards the ideas he sees in God as universals, Berkeley1 s criticism, 
vhieh is based on his own definition of the term, would seem only to 
show that we cannot regard the world of sense as existing as ve appre­
hend it in the divine mind*
‘gg. S. Thomas Aquinas, op. clt*. I, q. 14, a. 11 corpus, and ad 1.
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3, Occasionalism* According to Malebranehe, God is ths only 
possible cause of activity in the sensible (as veil as in the unknown,
material) world, the finite spirit having no power to move even the
63limbs of its own body. Berkeley amends this doctrine, sayingj "Ve
move our Legs ourselves} *tis ve that will their movement. Herein I
64differ from Halebranehe.* In so far as he denies that the "physical",
"material" oosaos can have within it the source of Its own activity, 
and restricts all causality to spirits, Berkeley (as Professor Jessop 
suggests^} may be called an Oeeasionalist. But he takes great care 
in analysing the function of matter in the Oeeasionalist system. In 
the Prlnoiploe. he shows that a completely unpereeivable and undeter­
mined substance, si the presence of which God causes ideas in our
minds, is an absurdity 1 it cannot exist in the mind, so it can exist
66nowhere at all) as described, it is close to non-entity (since its 
only attributes —  existence in general, and sons mysterious relation
to mind —  Berkeley holds to be inconceivable) j it cannot in any eon-
67ceivable m y  be "present to* us) and can only be "present to" God
68as an idea in His mind) and he concludes that "with regard to us it 
is no occasion! it remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the
£j(%
occasion to God of exciting ideas in us," According to this, matter
70
becomes, not a substance, but a divine idea* In the Second Dialogue
63
£1* Bntretlens. 711, x-xv, and Recherche. VI, ii, 3*
J&Sm., 548* 6W k s , II, 154.
^Principles. 67. 67Ibld.. 68-69.
, 71. ^Ibld.. 72.
70Ibid.. 71.
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Berkeley gives the rest of his argument. After Myles has stated the
Oeeasionalist position, Philonous replies that in it as God, the
sole cause of our ideas, implants then in us at the preseme of
"fixed and regular occasions," Be must perceive those oeeasions} but,
he adds, leaving aside all the difficulties inherent in this notion,
2 only ask whether the order and regularity observable ia the 
series of our ideas, or the course of Mature, be not sufficiently 
accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth 
not derogate from those attributes, to stqjpose Be is influenced, 
directed, or put in mind, when and what Be is to act, by any un­
thinking substance*
Furthermore, he concludes, how is it necessary to infer "the external
or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its
being perceived," simply because cm  allows "that there are certain
things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion
72of producing ideas ia us*f
4t.
Locke's approach to the problem of substanoe was unlike 
that of Descartes and Ifelebranohe, but in fact the extent and manner 
of his dependence on the traditional view of reality was not dis­
similar to theirs* On this point, James Gibson commentsi
It has been remarked more than once that while insisting that an 
enquiry into knowledge must precede the attempt to determine the 
nature of reality, Locke sever succeeded in freeing himself from 
certain presuppositions as to the general nature of that which 
possesses real being* At the outset, in the very endeavour to 
abstract from considerations of a metaphysical character, he takes 
for granted the validity of the categories which were fundamental 
for the thought of his age, and their adequacy for the interpretation 
of reality* And these categories were, in truth, a direct inherl-
71
Works. II, 220, 72Ibld.
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tanse froa Scholasticism. 2a tho eouroo of hit taqulTX, difficul- 
tios and perplexities arooo ia tho endeavour to roooaeilo thooo 
metaphysical conceptions with the new point of viov of tho experi­
ential theory of knowledge. Set even when he find* himself oonpelled 
to reeogaiie their eeeleeeneee for the purpoee of our knowledge, he 
does not question their ultimate validity. They are still regarded 
as representing the genuine nature of reality, though this Is now 
deelared to be beyond our comprehension. They are thus preserved 
froa the destructive foroe of his erltielsa by being relegated to
the region of the unknown, and to us unknowable....' 3
Bow we have seen that for Locke, we know ideas only) yet he
accepts "as axiomatic that reality can consist of nothing but sub*
7/
stances and their modifications". This notion led him into dif­
ficulties | but to appreciate then, ve must outline some further details 
of his system.
Looks distinguished simple and complex ideas, the simple
being given in external or internal sensation, and the complex being
75"voluntary combinations" of these simple ideas made by the mind.
There are three sorts of complex ideas, those of Mcdes, of Substances, 
and of Relations. Bov all the simple ideas of the primary and secondary 
qualities in things are real, because they have a foundation in Beture,
being in us either "constant effects or else exaot resemblances of
76something in the things themselves*. Thus they are "conformable to 
77
their archetypes*. Complex ideas of mixed modes and of relations
are likewise rwl or true, because they represent nothing outside the 
mind, "being themselves archetypes", and so "there is nothing more 
required to those kinds of ideas to make them real, but that they be
78so framed that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them."
73
James Gibson, Malg.Thgogr .ofrfoPwlfiflgl.Anllja. glgtoyfofil 
Relations. 19.0.
7^Ibld.. 193-> ^%ssay« II, xxx, 3. ^Ibid.. sect. 2.
" m . , sect. 1. 7<W  , sect. 4.
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Concerning substances, hows'rer, ha says*
All tha ideas va have of particular, dlatlnet aorta of sdbstanses, 
are nothing but several combinations of einple ldaaa co-existing 
in suoh, though unknown, cause of their union, aa makes tha whole 
subsist of itself. It ia by such combinations of staple ideas, and 
nothing else, that va represent particular aorta of substances to 
ourselves....79
Ideas of substances oan be called real only to tha extant that
dothey agree with tha existence of thingsj hence they are "unreal"
and Inadequate when they are "referred to a supposed real essence of
each species of things", or are looked upon aa "representation* in the
mind of things that do exist by ideas of those qualities that are die*
ooverable in then."81 There is included ia our complex idea of a
substance no idea of "seaethlng besides the figure, else and posture
of the solid parts of that body [vhieh] is its essence, something
82
called 'substantial form'". All the adnd can do is to frane ab­
stract general ideas of "nominal essences”} yet these are all that is 
required for the enlargement of knowledge.8^ Again, ”those qualities
and powers of substances whereof ve aake their eonplcs ideas, are so
8Amany and various that no nan's conplex idea contains then all."^
neither do they contain any 1dm of "the supposed, but unknown,
support of these qualities ve find existing, which ve imagine cannot
85
exist sine re substante. ‘without something to support then**. Thus,
ve have no idea at all of abstract substances, or substance in itself,
86and we are as ignorant of spiritual substance as of material, 
further, because ve knew substances by an enumeration of their proper-
^Issar. II, xxiii, 6. °^Ibld.. xxx, 5.
81Ibld.. xxxl, 6. 82Ibld. 8%g. ibid.. Ill, ill, 20.
g* ae.
IMS*, ®«1* 8. Ibid.. xxiii, 2. TMd.. sect. 5.
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ties vhieh ve oan never be sure is complete, end etn never diseover the
substantial form or nature from vhieh those properties flow, ve cannot
know that matter may not think,
it being, in respect to out notions, not much more remote from 
our comprehension to conceive that God oan, if he pleases, superadd 
to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it 
another substanoe vith a faculty of thinking) since ve knov not 
wherein thinking consists, nor to vhat sort of substances the Al­
mighty has been pleased to give that power vhieh cannot be in any 
created being but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the 
Creator,87
Hash has been said in earlier sections of this paper concerning 
Berkeley's criticisms of Locke’s notions of the objects of knowledge 
and the nature of substance. That need not be repeated here) but the 
last quotation from the issay concerning Jjmm. p idcratending does serve 
to remind us that Berkeley rejected Locke's notion of spiritual substance 
in favour of Descartes’s, when he came to elaborate his positive teaching, 
and held with the rationalist that the substantial form of the soul 
must be thought, since there is ne distinction betveen the soul and 
its faculties. His reason for doing this was that if Locke's con­
ception of Matter and Spirit (as in themselves unknowable) were true, 
"Clippings of beards & {wrings of nails may Think" for ought any one 
could tell, "The [Locke] seems positive of the Contrary."^ In other 
words, Locke said that ths mind cannot knov substance) to vhieh 
Berkeley replied, that the "late deservedly esteemed philosopher" had 
misconceived the nature both of knowledge and of substance. He was, 
Berkeley could say, partially "right* in his analysis of eaohi for he 
held that the objects of knovledgs are ideas, and that all ve knov of
i^ggftl, IV, Hi, 6. ^hll. Comm.. 718.
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"substance* ia a collection of sanaibla qualities| but ha vaa alao 
partially "wrong** for to spoke of ideas aa "images of things", and 
supposed that "collections of qualities" needed aonething unknown, 
aa it vara to support than in being, Berkeley may thus be regarded 
has having sought to use Locke’s principle, that we oan know only 
appearances with certainty, in order to refound the objectivity of 
a philosophy vhieh inconsistent theories concerning knowledge and 
the nature of reality had turned to subjectivity and scepticism.
Beecartes * Malebranche and Locke all tried to discover a nev 
way to arrive at a more perfect understanding of the reality of which 
Aristotle had given the classical description} yet —  perhaps because 
they were too much concerned with working out the details of the 
experiment —  they did not realise that the nev approaches of the 
sort they envisaged could only lead to the formation of an entirely 
nev concept of the real* and vhen applied to the old one* could only 
make it appear false and ludicrous, Berkeley was among the first modern 
thinkers to see that this vas true* and to allow the "nev way of ideas" 
to lead him where it would. He did not "destroy the world" i to abandoned 
a presupposition j and if* in that work of abandonment, to did not go 
far enough, his system is at least the result of an honest application 
of the principles vhieh to learned from his contemporaries.
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COKLIBIOM
froa the foregoing analysis, it la dear that Berkeley 
vaa one of a group of thinkers who attempted In various ways 
to aceoaodate the traditional Aristotelian eonoeptlon of 
reality to the nev conception of philosophy to vhieh the 
systen of Descartes gave currency. He vent further In this 
work of amendment than the thinkers by whom to was most in* 
flneneed —  looks and Mslebranehe —  but like then, to still 
retained much that vas traditional In elaborating his thought*
The Aristotelian universe vas a universe of substances, 
of aelf-subslstent beings vhieh could be knovn directly as sueh. 
Berkeley never once questions the validity of the category of 
substanoe as sueh, nor ever doubts that self-subsistent beings 
exist vhieh oan to knovn, Ha affiras the existence of the 
infinite creator God, and of the finite created spirit (or soul) 
on the basis of vhat night to called "personal variations" on 
the traditional proofs for these beings, and only denies the 
reality of an extramsntal, material vorld because the principles 
of the "nev philosophy* appear to him to have made this "unknowable 
and unintelligible".
Berkeley’s philosophy is at bottoa an attenpt to solve the 
problem of knowledge which Descartes had produced by his rigidly 
mathematical conceptions of mind and body (which, when defined, are
114
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as mutually exclusive as "circle" and "square"), and by his doctrine 
that ths objects of knowledge are ideast that is, that the mind does 
not transcend Itself in knowing. The Bishop consents that the objects 
of knowledge are by philosophers called "ideas8j but these are sup­
posed to be "images of things1* —  an Illogical and gratuitous 
assumption, based on an incomplete examination of the reasons for 
the "naive11 eommonsense notion that we know self-subsi stent, material 
things which exist independent of us. If we know ideas, that is all 
we knowt that these are "images", that they "represent" to us a 
reality existing outside our minds and "behind" them, are doctrines 
which are absolutely without foundation. Either we know things 
existing in re, or else we have no reason to suppose that such 
things exist} and philosophers, says Berkeley, have demonstrated 
that the first cannot be true. let they persist in saying that 
only when the mind's ideas are faithful copies of what is outside it, 
does it attain trutht froa this, only the most complete and "forlorn" 
scepticism can result. Therefore, the supposed material world per­
forms no conceivable function whatever, for material substances 
cannot possibly cause in us the immaterial, spiritual ideas we have 
of extended things. Hence, Berkeley teaches that on the principles 
which other philosophers have already laid down, a sufficient 
explanation of reality can be found in the mind which knows its own 
ideas, without calling in a useless, unknowable, impossible tertium 
qaid. matter. The ideas —  ths inert, eoapletely known sense-impres- 
slons —  which the mind knows have an objective value, not as images 
of anything extramental, but as the real constituents of the per­
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ceivable universe. The only “archetypes* they can possibly "answer to" 
would be the creative ideas in the mind of Godi indeed, the only pos­
sible cause of these ideas |f Co*S therefore God mast cause them, 
and Be must exist. This is Berkeley's "direct and immediate demon­
stration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God."1 
Personal Identity is a fact which consciousness of the ideas reveals, 
and which is necessary to explain perception, imagination and memory. 
Thus the finite spirit knows himself —  and by analogy, his fellew- 
spirits —  in knowing the ideas. Hence, these ideas lead us on a 
progress, not from thought to external, physical reality, but from 
mind to MLndf and the presuppositions of the philosophers, while 
they can main us certain of nothing that is non-mental, can be used 
to demonstrate the reality of the soul and the existence of God. By 
arguing in this fashion, Berkeley hopes at race to solve the Cartesian 
problem of our knowledge of extramental reality, and to liberate the 
philosopher from the scepticism inherent in Locke’s notion of substance, 
destroying once and for all the great arguments in favour of atheism. 
Indeed, it is because of this concern to put scepticism to rout and to 
establish a rational basic for faith, that Bishop Berkeley reminds us 
of another philosophising prelate, St. Augustine of Hippo.
Berkeley's rejection of the representational theory of knowledge
is complete. In the universe of spirits as he eonoeives it, radiant as 
it is with intelligibility and ardor, the materials of man's knowledge 
com directly from Godi and all that man knows, either by this J>ivine
Storks. II, 212.
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"infusion* of the data of sense, or as a result of hia own roaaonlnga 
upon witat ha has boon permitted to perceive, he knows directly, immediate­
ly, and without the intervention of any epistemological terM.ua quid.
In this connexion, the word "notion* signifies "the mental aa object", 
and cannot, apparently, be interpreted to have any psychological 
significance aa a modification of the intellect* Indeed, Berkeley 
expressly denies that even the ideas of sense can be "modes" or
"qualities* of the mind, "notional* knowledge is thus "eaqpty" know*
2
ledget its objects are not "in* the Bind at allf but this does not 
mean that the mind can "have a notion of* the naterial, axtraaental 
world* The mind knows a system of ideas which forms a complete reality 
in itself, outside of which it is both meaningless and impossible to 
look, unless it be to discover the perceiver, and the cause, of those 
ideas. All Intelligibility is in the realm of the lsnaterial, the 
spiritual| whatever is beyond this can only be completely unintelligible —  
like the prime natter of Aristotle, which is pure potency, and in itself 
unknowable. For this reason, although immaterialism nay have been par­
tially inspired by bocks*s empiricism, the abandonment of the enpiricist's 
view of the value of sense-knowledge for that of the Platonist or the 
Cartesian would not appear to effect the validity of Berkeley's argument*
Berkeley was in many ways a man of his age and was much indebted 
to the thinkers who immediately preoeeded him} but as far as the main 
conclusions of his thought are concerned, the contemporary influences 
upon him were largely negative* The following points may be liatedi
2Cf. Sydney Rome, "Berkeley's Conceptualism", Philosophical 
Review, lf“(19l*6), 681*692*
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m1. He greatly admired Hewton as an experimental philosopher, 
aad even made seme use of hie method) but he rejected the conclusions 
of Kevtoniaa physios.
2. With Descartes, he held that the essence of a substance 
can be known in terms of its principal attribute j but he saw that 
the attribute vhioh Descartes had assigned to material substance 
could not possibly belong to it. Both thinkers are concerned with 
proving that it is possible to know self-subsistent beings, and both 
argue that what cannot be understood (er "clearly and distinctly" 
thought) aust be rejected from philosophy. Both agree in calling 
the objects of knowledge "ideas", but differ considerably in their 
definitions of the tern.
3. Malebranehe taught that we never know the material world 
at all save by faith) that there is no sere connexion between a 
body and its soul than there is between two bodies or two souls) 
and that our knowledge coses directly from God, Who is the author 
of all the activity in nature, Berkeley saw in all these doctrines 
proof that an exterior, material world cannot exist, and further 
modified Malebranehe's Occasionalism to include the activity of 
finite spirits,
4. FTom locks, he learnt that the mind knows "ideas" whioh 
are data of sense, and that collections of those ideas make up all 
that we can actually know of supposedly self*subsistent beings in the 
world of sense. But he rejected the representational theory of 
knowledge as found in both Locke and Descartes, and denied that 
"Ideas" could ever be "images" of anything like themselves outside
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th« mind, or that thay could he caused in us by anything non-spiritual, 
Ha likewise rejected Locke1b notion of substance of tha substratum of 
perceivable qualities as productive of scepticism in our knowledge of 
spirits as wall as bodies,
Berkeley may be said to have "solved" the problem of know­
ledge which the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body had produced, 
by denying one of the terns of that dichotomy} in the same way, he 
nay be said to have "solved" the problem of substance by shoving 
that the empiricist or Lockean notion of substance was meaningless 
whan applied either to matter or spirit, and that the rationalist 
or Cartesian conception of It was Intelligible only when referred 
to spirits.
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